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1. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR MEDICARE
1.1 Introduction
Medicare, the universal health insurance program for elderly people initiated in 1965, has
undergone extensive changes in coverage and compensation methods. Surprisingly, one as-
pect that has been unchanged is the age at which people become eligible. The Medicare
eligibility age (MEA), was initially set at 65 in accordance with the Full Retirement Age
(FRA)1. While the FRA was changed gradually from age 65 to 67 in response to demo-
graphic changes and the increasing pressure on the federal budget, the MEA has remained
unchanged.
As baby boomers are approaching the retirement age, the aggregate utilization of Medi-
care is rising. Improvements in the medical industry, have led to an increase in life expectancy
and a rise in Medical expenditures. As a result, people are using Medicare insurance for
longer and more expensive services. Both factors have an adverse effect on the federal bud-
get. One policy suggestion is to raise the MEA and reduce the burden on the federal budget2.
The key concerns are the potential effects on the physical as well as mental health of the
elderly population and change in welfare.
The MEA affects the access to the medical care and possibly alters people incentives to
pursue a healthier lifestyle. As a result, changes in the MEA can potentially affect health
outcomes. The direction of this effect is, however, ambiguous. I address two main questions
in this paper. First, ”what is the effect of an increase in the MEA on both physical and
1 The age at which a person may first become entitled to full or unreduced retirement benefits.
2 Fontaine et al. (2011)
mental health of the near-retirement and elderly people”. And second, ”what is the welfare
effect of this change in policy?”
Because of the lack of exogenous treatments (changes in MEA), researchers cannot employ
simple evaluation methods such as randomized controlled trial. This limitation necessitates
the use of structural estimation techniques. Also structural estimation helps to reduce the
ambiguity in the direction of the health effects by providing detailed mechanisms indicating
how different dimensions of health and health investment affect other behaviors such as labor
supply, consumption and ultimately welfare.
In determining the effect of a change in MEA on health outcomes, both labor supply
and health investment decisions should be taken into account. A change in the MEA might
affect health outcome negatively, by limiting access to health insurance, and consequently
health care utilization. But, people also have other options to improve their health, such
as pursuing a healthier lifestyle by altering their smoking habits or exercising patterns.
Ruhm (2000) discusses that health behaviors can compensate for the negative health effects
from a reduction in income or losing employer provided health insurance, the channel that
accentuates the role of a budget constraint in health investment decisions. Ex-ante moral
hazard, as tracked by health behaviors, is another channel that affects health behavior and
ultimately health [Dhaval and Kaestner (2009), Stanciole (2008), and Kelly and Markowitz
(2009)]. People can change their health behaviors as a response to a change in the price of
medical services. A rise in the MEA, consecutively can trigger such behaviors since it delays
the access to the inexpensive Medicare health insurance and leaves more expensive health
insurance plans as the only feasible options. While budget constraint and medical services
price are both possibly altered as a result of a change in MEA, it is necessary to incorporate
these channels into analysis where the goal is to evaluate the effect of a change in MEA on
health.
Although the existence of an endogenous change in health behaviors is well documented,
the limited studies which investigate the change in the MEA disregard endogeneity problem.
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This happens because of the curse of dimensionality that limits the inclusion of more factors
in a structural estimation model. Blau and Gilleskie (2008), for example show that raising
MEA to 67 has a minor effect on the labor supply when the effect of the health insurance
can only be transmitted through the budget constraint, production of health, and aversion
to risk. French and Jones (2011) provide a model of retirement and health insurance and
analyze the effect of a change in the age of Medicare eligibility on the labor supply. They
find that raising the age of Medicare eligibility from 65 to 67 increases labor supply modestly
between age 60 to 69. Their main focus, however, is not health status; they do not model
health behavior as a decision and their only measure of health is self-reported health. Scholz
and Seshadri (2013) endogenize the total medical expenditure and exercise as decisions which
affect the production of health. They find that the availability of the postretirement health
insurance affects the household’s retirement decisions and as a result they retire one quarter
earlier. Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016) propose a stochastic life-cycle framework with rational
agents who maximize lifetime utility over consumption, leisure, and health investments. In
addressing the retirement decision, they do not allow for a reversible retirement decision
(returning to the job market after declaring retirement). As a result, their model is not
flexible enough to explain partial retirement and returns to the labor force. All of these
phenomena are observed frequently in recent data, and they are important determinants of
health behaviors and health outcomes.
This study improves upon the available models of health insurance and retirement by
incorporating health behavior channels as decisions; this addresses the ex-ante moral hazard
in the health insurance literature, as well as the possibility of the return to work after
retirement that affects monetary budget constraint. I introduce a model of health investment
and labor supply with endogenous and explicitly modeled health investment decisions about
smoking and exercise. Using the longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) from 2000 to 2014, I look at both physical and mental health outcomes.
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I measure mental health, using the objective index of the CES-D scale3. To avoid the
subjectivity problem of the measure of physical health, I produce a new physical health index,
using the various objective aspects of health, such as Activities of Daily Living (ADLs),
Functional Limitations and different health conditions4 using Item Response Theory (IRT)
estimated by Bayesian methods. The dynamic optimization model that I provide is capable
of measuring the effect of the change in MEA on the physical and mental health outcomes
of the elderly people while taking into account endogenous health behaviors.
I use Conditional Choice Probability Estimator of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), to
reduce the computational burden in the structural estimation of my model. This allows for
a more detailed state space and decision set in the model, as well as incorporating unobserved
fixed heterogeneity types.
In particular, this paper:
• Studies the impact of a change in Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 69 on the welfare,
physical, and mental health of the elderly population in the U.S.
• Provides a structural model of Health investment and Labor Supply that accounts for
the endogenous health investments.
• Applies Conditional Choice Probability in the health and retirement models.
I show that raising MEA from 65 to 69 improves physical and mental health status.
As a result of this policy change, men work 151 hours more annually and live for about
0.46 years longer; Also, from the federal budget point of view, I find some evidence of cost
transfer from the Medicare program to the Social Security program. Mean lifetime social
security benefit collection increases by $ 12,688. That is due to the increase in labor supply,
postponing the social security benefits claim, raising monthly benefits, and the increase in
3 Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D)
4 Different health conditions are: Blood Pressure, Diabetes, Cancer, Lung Disease, Heart Problem, Stroke,
Psychological Problem and, Arthritis
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the life expectancy. Welfare will be affected negatively as a result of the change in MEA.
People, on average, would ask for about $ 151,000 to accept the change as of age 50.
I begin with a background discussion of the relevant aspects of the Medicare program
and related literature. Section two introduces the model where I discuss timing, per-period
decisions, transition probabilities, state variables and the specification of the model. Section
three describes the data and construction of the variables. Section four discusses the estima-
tion method. Section five provides the results for the model performance and counterfactual
policy effects, and section six concludes.
1.1.1 Medicare and Backgroung
Passed in 1965 and implemented in 1966, Medicare provides nationwide and mandatory
health insurance for individuals aged 65 and older. It subsequently expanded to include
people who are permanently disabled for at least two years and those with the end-stage
renal disease who need kidney dialysis treatments or kidney transplant. Medicare has two
main parts which were incorporated into the program from the beginning and insured indi-
viduals against hospital services expenditures and physician services costs (Part A and Part
B). Through time the Medicare program became more comprehensive. In what follows, I
summarize a background on the aspects of Medicare which are more relevant to the analysis
in the current study:
Part A (Hospital Services): It pays for services provided by hospitals. Enrollment in
part A was mandatory for every individual older than 65 or receiving social security
benefit. Medicare part A is paid by the Medicare trust fund, which is a government
account funded by income tax and Medicare tax which adds to worker’s Social Security
tax. In the initial design, Medicare Part A is not paying for hospital care of the first
day of the hospital visit. Then Medicare pays 100 % of hospital charges for days 2 to
60. From day 61 to 90, Medicare pays for 25 %, then 50 % for days 91-150. Medicare
does not compensate costs for days 151 and beyond.
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Part B (Physician Services): The second part is part B that covers the physician
services and was called Supplemental Medical Insurance. Part B is voluntary health
insurance, although the premiums were so low that almost all of the Part A Medicare
beneficiaries were participating in Part B as well. The premium for Part B has not
remained constant through time. Starting from $ 3 per month, Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) set the basic Part B premium at $96.4 in 2008. Then in
2010, CMS introduced the program that is called income-related monthly adjustment
amount (IRMAA) and set the premium to be higher for individuals with more than
$ 85,000 annual income with a sliding income scale. This scheme reaches the highest
premium of up to $ 396.1 per month. Medicare Part B is funded by the combination of
the premiums and revenues respectively. Law specifies that the premiums for Medicare
Part B should cover 25 % of the program’s costs.
Part D (Drugs): In 2006, a new Part D added prescription drug insurance. The
growing importance of the new drugs in curing diseases which previously required
hospitalization, and increasing demand for the new drugs, led the CMS to introduce
Medicare Part D. The program offers catastrophic protection to those with large ex-
penses, but not to those with intermediate drug expenses. The program does not pay
for the first $ 320. From $ 320 to $ 2,930, it pays for 75 % of the expenses. Then from
$ 2,930 to $ 6,657.5, there is a so-called “donut hole” where the program does not pay
any amount on drugs. For the expenses which exceed $ 6,657.5 program almost fully
compensates the costs by paying for 95 % of the costs.
Medigap: While Part B is supplemental insurance, there is another type of supplemen-
tal insurance that is less common. Private Supplemental Insurance or Medigap had
about 12 million enrollees in 2015 where the number of Medicare beneficiaries reached
a total of 55 million. Medicare coverage leaves some people uninsured or under-insured.
Medicare Part A is not insuring against large health shocks when patients need a long
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period of hospitalization. Donut hole in Part D, leaves individuals with intermediate
to large drug expenses under-insured. Medigap fills in the gap through private health
insurance contracts. The annual premiums of the Medigap policies vary according to
the plan chosen and location. The average across the nation in 2005 was between $
1,150 to $ 1,750 with a significant variation depending on the location.
Medicare is the third largest program in the federal budget. In 2016, total Medicare
expenditures were $ 679 billion and about 3.64 % of GDP [The Boards of Trustees (2017)].
The Boards of Trustees (2017) predicts that by the current increasing trend in the Medicare
expenditures, trust fund becomes depleted in 2029. Fiscal pressure on Medicare steams the
discussion of the different cost-saving measures. Most proposals focus on measures to limit
the growth rate by altering the provider payment methods, expanding the cost-sharing aspect
of the Medicare, and a less discussed measure of raising the MEA to reduce the number of
beneficiaries.
One of the consequences of a rise in MEA is the change in retirement patterns as a result
of the interaction between MEA and Full Retirement Age (FRA), as discussed by French
(2005). FRA is defined as the age in which individuals with sufficient employment history
become eligible to claim to receive Social Security Benefits, and was raised from 65 to 67 to
address the recent changes in U.S. demography. Since the initiation of the Medicare program
in 1965, the life expectancy for a 65-year-old man has risen by more than five years. This
improvement in life expectancy is about four years for a 65-year-old woman.
There are abundant studies on the cost-saving aspects of a rise in MEA and its impact on
healthcare utilization, the effect on health outcome, however, is less explored. Congressional
Budget Office (2016) estimate that raising MEA from 65 to 67, by two months each year, and
starting in 2020 produces a net saving of $ 14.9 billion between 2020 to 2026. Lichtenberg
(2002) analyzes the effect of the healthcare utilization and documents a sharp increase in
ambulatory care at age 65 and a smaller increase in inpatient care. He also finds some
evidence of fewer hospital days and a lower probability of death than would be predicted
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based on pre-65 trends. Finkelstein (2007) shows that the introduction of Medicare was
associated with an increase in health care utilization and spending. Card et al. (2008) find
that the Medicare eligibility threshold at age 65 is associated with an increase in health
insurance coverage as well as an increase in medical care services. Assuming that Medicare
is designed to fill the gap in the health insurance coverage, resulting from the termination of
employer health insurance, Lichtenberg (2002) argues that it is expected to see no difference
in the health care utilization before and after age 65. Hence, increase in utilization can
be interpreted as a sign of postponing of the healthcare utilization as individuals approach
MEA.
The effect of the Medicare on health is less obvious. Card et al. (2008), using regression-
discontinuity design around MEA (at age 65) and find that Medicare eligibility reduces 7-day
to 9 months mortality by about .8 to 1 percentage points. Finkelstein and McKnight (2008)
on the other hand, use age-based identification strategy and exploiting the geographical
variation in the increase in health insurance coverage, resulted from introducing of Medicare
and show there is, at best, very modest health benefit from Medicare. Although, they show
that the introduction of Medicare had a positive welfare effect by reducing the risk exposure
of the large health shocks. This study finds that the current policy with MEA at 65 is not
optimum and compared with the policy with MEA at 69, hurts both mental and physical
health as measured by depression and an objective measure of physical health, respectively.
1.2 Model
I develop a dynamic model in which agents are maximizing their discounted lifetime utility by
deciding over consumption, leisure, individual health investments and purchase of insurance
policies. Because of the data structure, every period in the model corresponds with two
years in the data.
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1.2.1 Variables
The variables can be separated into three distinctive groups: state variables, temporary
variables, and decision variables. State variables (S) are those variables that individual
requires to be informed about their values at the beginning of each period in order to update
his current period decisions and state. Temporary variables (N) are not transferred from one
period to the next and instead are calculated in every period and incorporate in the process
of shaping the state variables. Lastly, the decision variables (D) are chosen by individual in
every period, using utility maximization rationale.
1.2.1.1 State Variables
This group contains seven different sets of variables, including macro shock, attributes, em-
ployment history, health, reactionary healthcare, monetary variables, and unobserved het-
erogeneity.
Macro shock: Economic shock (σe) determines if economy is in the bad state or not;
Attributes: Age(A), education(E), full retirement age(f), gender(g), marital status(m);
Employment History: Tenure(x1), experience(x2), involuntary job loss(σl);
Health: Physical Health(hp), mental health(hm), number of health conditions(hc);
Reactionary Healthcare: Number of nights in hospital(k1), number of doctor visits(k2);
Monetary variables: Social security benefit amount(SSB), total medical
expenditure(ME), assets(a), medicare(im)
Unobserved Heterogeneity Type: Determines the fixed and unobserved het-
erogeneities which can be one of the three types (δ)
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Hence the vector of the state variables is defined as:
−→
S t = {σ
e
t , At, E, f, g,mt, x
1
t , x
2
t , σ
l
t,
hpt , h
m
t , h
c
t , k
1
t , k
2
t , SSBt,MEt, at, i
m
t , δ}
1.2.1.2 Temporary Variables
These variables are produced in every period and will be used to calculate the state variables.
Since state variables convey all the necessary information for the next period decision-making
process and transitions, there is no need to pass the temporary variables to the next period.
The model consists of the eight temporary variables:
−→
N t = {yt, OOPt, ip
emp
t , ip
prv
t , ip
m
t , ssb
earl
t , ssb
full
t , ssb
late
t }
Where yt is income in period t, OOPt is the out-of-pocket medical expenditure, ip
emp
t is the
premium to pay if one acquires health insurance from the employer; ipprvt is the premium for
the private health insurance; ipmt is the health insurance premium for the Medicare; ssb
earl
t
is the social security benefit amount if person claims the social security at the earliest time
possible5 conditional on being in that age; ssbfullt is the social security benefit amount at
being made around the full retirement age; and ssblatet is the social security benefit amount,
if a person delays her social security benefit.
1.2.1.3 Decision Variables
In every period the agent makes decisions regarding consumption level (ct), labor supply
6,
buying private health insurance (iprvt ), buying health insurance from employer (i
emp
t ), exercise
5 Early retirement age is 62.
6 Employment (et) or leisure (Lt)
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(et) and, smoking (st). This makes the decision vector Dt:
−→
D t = {ct, Lt, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , et, st}
I assume that the job search cost is zero and an agent can decide to work unconditionally.
However, income is a deterministic function of the state and decision variables and imposes
restrictions on the budget constraint. I also assume that employer-provided health insur-
ance is available, and it is only up to the agent’s decision whether to purchase it or not The
insurance premium does affect the agent’s choice through the budget constraint.
1.2.2 Timing
Beginning each period t, agent is in state
−→
S t−1, which is the state at the end of the previ-
ous period. Variables such as gender and full retirement age are fixed through time, I also
assume that education is fixed and since the study population contains only people older
than 50 years, this assumption is not restrictive. Furthermore, I allow for fixed, unobserved
heterogeneity. As a result, four of the state variables (gender, full retirement age, education,
and unobserved fixed heterogeneity) are constant for each individual over time. However,
other variables are changing through time. I implement a step by step updating procedure
to better understand the model.
As depicted in figure 1.2.2, at the beginning of period t an economic shock hits the
economy. Economic shock is a dummy that is one if a bad economic shock hits, and zero
otherwise. The combination of the economic shock (σet ) and St−1 affects the probability
of receiving a layoff shock for each individual, and this determines layoffs for individuals
who were working in period t − 1 (σlt) and their tenure (x
1
t ). Next, mental health will
be updated stochastically knowing the occurrence of layoff (σlt) and subsequently, health
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insurance premiums for three insurance types 7 will be revealed (ipempt for employer-provided
health insurance, iprvt for the private health insurance and ı
m
t for Medicare health insurance).
Fig. 1.1: The updating sequence of the variables in the model.
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In every period, agent inherits the state from the end of the previous period St−1. Showing shocks by the
black circles, the updating sequence follows the direction which is shown by the two arrows.
7 Employer health insurance (iempt ), Private health insurance (i
prv
t ) and Medicare (i
m
t ) if accessible.
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Next, individual makes simultaneous decisions about the consumption level (ct), leisure
(lt), buying health insurance from employer (ı
emp
t ), buying private health insurance (ı
prv
t ),
smoking (st) and exercise (et). After the decisions, income from working (yt), Age (At),
tenure (x1t ), experience (x
2
t ) and receiving Medicare (i
m
t ) are determined deterministically.
Then, both of the reactionary healthcare variables (number of nights in hospital and num-
ber of doctor visits) will be renewed, knowing the updated types of the health insurance,
decisions, income, age as well as variables which have not yet been updated. In the next
step, health shock is revealed and as a result, physical health (hpt ) and the number of health
conditions (hct) can be determined, stochastically. Then, a marriage shock hits the individual
and will determine marriage status (mt). Social security benefit (SSBt) and total health
care expenditures (MEt) are next to be renewed.
If the individual already had applied for the social security benefit, its amount will be
unchanged, but if he had not been claimed it, conditional on reaching early retirement age,
the individual would receive social security benefit shock that determines if he will claim it
in this period or not. Then, the social security benefit amount is a deterministic function of
the individual’s updated state (S) and particularly work experience and income. Knowing
the health insurance type, I deterministically set the health insurance co-payment levels and
hence can determine the out-of-pocket medical expenditure (OOPt). Finally, knowing assets
level from previous period (at−1), consumption level (ct), income (yt), social security ben-
efit (SSBt,), health insurance premium and out-of-pocket medical expenditure, assets will
be updated stochastically conditional on the interest rate (rt). The timing is shown in the
figure 1.2.2 and is explored in more details in the Appendix A.
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1.2.3 Utility Specification
The utility flow in each period is function of , consumption , health behaviors, health sta-
tus, leisure and different types of the health insurance. I assume a semi CES preferences
that is flexible and allows for unconstrained optimization of the likelihood. Moreover, the
parameters will be estimated for three different types of heterogeneity:
u(c, L, e, s, iprv, iemp, hp, A,m, a) =
T∑
t=1
βt−1δ
{
I[hpt 6= 6]×
{((
exp (φ¯+ φ0δ + φ
A
δ .At + φ
hp
δ .h
p
t )L
1/γL
δ + θeδ . exp
(φeAt) .et + 1
)
.
(
θcδ.
( ct
(1 +mt).7
)1/γc
δ
+ θsδ . exp
(φs.At) .st + 1
))
+
(
θprvδ . exp
(φprv .At) .iprvt
)
+
(
θempδ .i
emp
t
)}
+ [(hpt = 6]×
{
λδ.a
1/γc
δ
t
}}
(1.1)
Where, At is age at time t, h
p
t is physical health, Lt is the leisure, ct is consumption level,
st is smoking dummy which is one if smoking, et is exercise dummy, i
emp
t is dummy that
indicates the purchase of employer provided health insurance and iprvt is dummy variable for
the private health insurance, ǫt is a choice specific unobserved (to the researcher) preference
shock. The index δ indicates that the parameter is estimated separately for each unobserved
heterogeneity types (δ ∈ {1, 2, 3}). I follow Scholz and Seshadri (2013) and French et al.
(2016) among others to use an equivalence scale for consumption, so that couples are con-
suming less than twice of the amount of separate individuals. Also I use a bequest function
that allows the individuals to enjoy their bequest in the last period they appear in the model.
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1.2.3.1 Assets law of motion
Assets evolve, by the following constraint:
at+1 = yt + at(1 + rt)
+ SSBt −OOPt − ct − ip
emp
t .i
emp
t − ip
prv
t .i
prv
t − ip
m
t .i
m
t
(1.2)
I do not model the cigarette price explicitly and assume that cigarette expenditure is negli-
gible comparing to the other components of asset.
1.2.3.2 Health Insurance Premiums
Health insurance premiums for three types of insurance in the model are deterministic func-
tions of updated states. More specifically I assume the covariate vector:
−→
X ip = [1,mt−1, h
m
t−1, h
m
t−1
2
, At−1, At−1
2, hct−1, h
c
t−1
2
, k1t−1, k
1
t−1
2
, k2t−1, k
2
t−1
2
, i
emp
t−1 , Lt−1, st−1, g, f, E,E
2]
and use three linear transformations, using pre-estimated coefficients
−→
β ip to determine the
premia;
ip
emp
t =
−→
X ip ×
−→
β′emp (1.3)
ip
prv
t =
−→
X ip ×
−→
β′prv (1.4)
ipmt =
−→
X ip ×
−→
β′m (1.5)
1.2.3.3 Income
After individual makes decisions for consumption, labor supply, healthy behaviors and dif-
ferent health insurance types, income will set deterministically using a linear transformation:
yt =
−→
X y ×
−→
β′y (1.6)
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Where
−→
X y = [1,mt−1, At−1, At−1
2, h
p
t−1, h
p
t−1
2
, hmt−1, h
m
t−1
2
, k1t−1, k
1
t−1
2
, g, E,E2, x1t , x
1
t
2
, i
emp
t , Lt, st]
1.2.3.4 Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditure
Out-of-pocket medical expenditure, depends on the health insurance type. Since, the differ-
ent types and details of the insurance can affect the co-payment rates, and due to lack of
data, I do not explicitly model all the details. I employ other attributes of the state space to
better predict co-payments and hence the out-of-pocket medical expenditure. I predict the
out-of-pocket medical expenditures, using the linear transformation :
OOPt =
−→
XOOP ×
−→
β′OOP (1.7)
Where
−→
XOOP =[1,mt, At, At
2, hmt , (h
m
t )
2
, hct , (h
c
t)
2
, k1t , (k
1
t )
2
, k2t , (k
2
t )
2
, g, E,E2...
, et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t , (i
prv
t .i
m
t ), (i
emp
t .i
prv
t ), (i
m
t .i
emp
t ), (i
emp
t .i
prv
t .i
m
t )]
Where,
−→
β OOP is a 1× 24 vector of coefficients.
Social Security Benefits
The amount of the Social Security Benefits is determined using the transformation and shock
structure which is discussed in details in Appendix A.
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1.2.4 Dynamic Optimization
Assuming forward looking agents and by utilizing Bellman’s principle of optimality, the best
possible value of the present discounted payoff is defined recursively:
Vt(
−→
S t, ǫt) = max−→
D t
(
u(
−→
S t,
−→
D t, ǫt(
−→
D t)) + βE(Vt+1(
−→
S t+1, ǫt+1(
−→
D t+1)|
−→
S t,
−→
D t))
)
where
−→
S is vector of state variables and
−→
D is vector of decisions. Assuming Conditional
Independence (CI) and Additive Separability (AS), ex ante value function can be defined as:
V¯t(
−→
S t) =
∫
Vt((
−→
S t, ǫt)g(ǫt)dǫt = Emax−→
D
(
ν(
−→
D,
−→
S t) + ǫt
)
(1.8)
where ν(
−→
D,
−→
S t), is choice specific value function and can be written as:
ν(
−→
D t,
−→
S t) = u(
−→
D t,
−→
S t) + β
∫
¯
V (
−→
S t)dF (
−→
S t+1|
−→
D t,
−→
S t) (1.9)
More specifically I define the choice specific value function as:
ν(
−→
S t,
−→
D t) =u(
−→
S t,
−→
D t)+
+β.
{∑
St
(
π(x2,t+1|Dt).π(At+1).π(i
m
t+1).π(k
1
t+1|
−→
X k1).π(k
2
t+1|
−→
X k2)
.π(hpt+1|
−→
X hp).π(h
c
t+1|
−→
X hc).π(mt+1|
−→
Xm).π(SSBt+1|
−→
X SSB).π(MEt+1|
−→
XME)
.π(rt+1|σ
e).π(σlt+1|
−→
X l).π(x1,t+1|
−→
X x1).π(h
m
t+1|
−→
X hm)
)
.V¯ (
−→
S t+1)
}
(1.10)
where π(.)’s are the transition probabilities conditional on the most recently updated sub-
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space of the state space and decisions, the vector
−→
X is defined as follows:
−→
X k1 = [Dt,mt−1, h
p
t−1, At, yt, et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
−→
X k2 =
−→
X k1
−→
X hp = [Dt,mt−1, h
p
t−1, h
c
t−1, at−1, g, E,At, Lt, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st]
−→
X hc = [Dt,mt−1, h
c
t−1, h
p
t , At, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
−→
Xm = [Dt,mt−1, h
p
t , h
c
t , At, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
−→
X SSB = [Dt, at−1, g, E,mt, h
m
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p
t , h
c
t , At, Lt, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st, σ
e
t , ct]
−→
X ssb = [Dt,mt, ssbt−1, yt, g, x
1
t , x
2
t ]
−→
XME = [Dt,mt, h
p
t , h
c
t , At, k
1
t , k
2
t , g, E]
−→
X l = [Dt,mt−1, x
1
t−1, yt−1, σ
e
t ]
−→
X x1 = [Dt, Lt−1]
−→
X hm = [Dt,mt−1, h
m
t−1, At−1, h
p
t−1, Lt−1, yt−1, k
1
t−1, k
2
t−1, h
c
t−1, at−1, ct−1, g, E, σ
e
t ]
1.3 Data
I am using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and HRS-RAND (version P) database
as the main source, to estimate the model. HRS is a nationally representative, biannual,
longitudinal survey that interviews people older than 50 years old. I employ the waves 5-12
which matches the years 2000 to 2014. I also use Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly
data from January 1998 to January 2014 to construct an instrument of the variable for
involuntary layoff. In this section, I explain the construction of all the variables which were
previously discussed in section 1.2.
I start with 181, 033 person-year observations and drop all the persons with missing values
for the variables I use in estimation. I also drop all individuals who receive Medicaid, are
not financially respondent of the household and observations with wealth greater than $
2,000,000. This leaves 115, 488 observations of 22, 355 unique individuals. In what follows in
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this section, I discuss the construction of the estimation variables. Variables are separated
into four different groups: Attributes, employment, health, and monetary variables.
1.3.1 Attributes
Attributes include age (A), education (E), full retirement age (f), gender (G), and marital
status (m). Since there is no ambiguity about the gender, I do not discuss it further. To
construct age, I drop all the interviewees who are younger than 50 years. Then age bins will
be constructed by leveling age at the even numbers, beginning from 50. As a result, both
individuals who are 50 and 51, are coded as 50 in my estimation sample. This procedure is
done to reduce the size of the state space while simultaneously keeping track of the dynamics
in the biennial database of HRS.
HRS reports each person’s years of education. I reduce it to seven categories. If an
individual has less than nine years of education, it is coded as 0. Years of education between
9 and eleven is coded as 9 and reflects some high school. 12 is coded unchanged and is
associated with a high school diploma. Then, anything between 13 and 15 years of education
is considered 13 and depicts some college. 16 is coded as itself and is the college degree.
Finally, anything more than 16 is coded as 17 and is regarded as graduate school experience.
Full retirement age is gradually changed from 65 to 66 by two months increments for
every one year increase in the birth year beginning from 1938. Table 1.1 shows changes in
details. I set the full retirement age to 65 for people whose birth year is before 1943. All
people who are born in 1943 or later are assigned full retirement age of 66.
Tab. 1.1: Full Retirement Age variation of the different cohorts
Year of Birth <1938 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943-1954
Full Retirement Age 65
65 and 2
months
65 and 4
months
65 and 6
months
65 and 8
months
65 and 10
months
66
Year of FRA <2003 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2008-9 2009-2020
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1.3.2 Employment
Employment variables are leisure(work), tenure in the current job, experience, and invol-
untary layoff. Leisure takes three values of 0, 1/2, and one, if a person works full-time,
part-time, and not working, respectively. Following the RAND database definition, I as-
sume that person is working full-time if working 35+ hours per week, 36+ weeks per year.
Any amount less than this (1260 hours) is considered as part-time. Full-time job status
reflects 1800 hours annual work. I assume people who reported their labor force status as
unemployed, retired or not in labor force are all not working and set their leisure to 1.
Tenure reports the tenure years in the current job. I code it as a discrete variable with
two years increments, starting from 0. As a result, an individual’s tenure is coded as zero if
either he reports zero or one. I top code the individuals with more than 20 years of tenure
as 20 to set the limit for the state space at the expense of the loss of outliers.
Experience keeps track of total years of work for each individual. Similar to tenure, I
code experience by two years increments and to code it at 40 years of experience. As a result,
experience takes one of the 20 possible values increasing by two years increments starting
from 0.
Involuntary job loss is a dummy variable that is one if job loss is due to layoff or business
closure and zero otherwise. Thus, all other job losses are coded as a quit and not considered
involuntary layoff. Using the CPS monthly, short panel data, I calculate Job Separation and
Job Entrance rates for each industry-census region. Then I use these measures as instruments
for involuntary layoff to address endogeneity concerns caused by the mental and physical
health status effects on the probability of receiving layoff shock. In the CPS I can observe
each individual for four consecutive months. The individual is excluded from the survey
for eight months, then included again for an additional four months. If individual reports
that he is not working in the industry that was reported in a previous month, I add one job
separation for current month-industry-region. The denominator of the Job Separation ratio
is the last month’s total number of people in that industry-region. The same logic is used
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when creating the job entrance ratio.
1.3.3 Health
Measuring health can be a subtle task due to the ambiguity in the definition of health. The
word “Health,” in contrast with its everyday life usage, does not have a precise definition.
While cancer and feeling of pain both affect ”health,” they affect different decisions. I
separate the analysis of health into the three subcategories of physical health, mental health,
and health conditions.
HRS provides self-reported health status, as well as a rich set of questions which are
designed to objectively report different dimensions of an individual’s health. While it is con-
venient to use a uni-dimensional measure of health such as self-reported health, as a measure
of physical health, the subjectivity of this measure and the problem of potential misreport-
ing, can contaminate self-reported health as a proxy for physical health and hence any result
which is made based upon it. On the other hand, relying upon objective, multi-dimensional
sets of variables to summarize a person’s health, inherits the problem of revealing the cor-
rect weight for each dimension. I address this issue using Item Response Theory (IRT) as
discussed by Firouzi Naeim (2017). I assume there is an underlying physical health status
that governs an individual’s response to the different items. Items are sets of objective ques-
tions; each is measuring a particular aspect of physical health. I inform the impulse response
function in the IRT process by a set of objective variables which are designed to measure
functional limitations and health dummy that takes value one if individual reports that her
health takes a value greater than or equal to 3. HRS asks individuals three sets of ques-
tions under a general category of Functional Limitations: Activities of daily living (ADL),
Lower Body Mobility (LBM) and Upper Body Agility (UBA). The underlying variables in
each group and their associated survey question is summarized in Table 1.2. I assume that
the probability of a binary response to each item follows a Probit model and estimate two
parameters for each item: Sensitivity and scale. Sensitivity provides information on the
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exactness of the item and its sensitivity to the true underlying physical health. The scale
shows how likely is it that individuals respond to an item either negatively or positively. I
employ a Bayesian approach, more specifically the Gibbs sampling method, to uncover the
underlying physical health (a posterior distribution) of each individual in the sample at each
date.
To provide aspects of health that self-reported health does not represent, HRS asks indi-
viduals if they have ever been told by a doctor that they have high Blood Pressure, Diabetes,
Cancer, Lung Disease, Heart Problems, Stroke, Psychological Problems or Arthritis. I make
a new variable (number of health conditions) by summing up the different health conditions.
This variable takes integers from 0 to 8.
For mental health, I use CES-D8 to track the depression patterns as a proxy for mental
health. CES-D is an index that is made by aggregating different objective mental health-
related measures in the survey and takes integer values from 0 to 8.
1.3.4 Monetary Variables
This group includes income, assets, consumption, and social security benefits. I adjust all
variables for inflation, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the base year 2000. As
a result, all the variables are in real terms. I drop observations with $ 200,000 or more in
real income as high earners. Then, I discretize income into five bins, with increments of
40,000 $. Assets are the sum of all wealth components after subtracting by all debts. (
Value of primary residence + Net value of real estate + Net value of vehicles + Net value
of businesses + Net value of IRA, Keogh accounts + Net value of stocks, mutual funds, and
investment trusts + Value of checking, savings, or money market accounts + Value of CD,
government savings bonds, and T-bills + Net value of bonds and bond funds + Net value of
all other savings ) - ( Value of all mortgages/land contracts (primary residence) + Value of
other home loans (primary residence) + Value of other debt )
8 Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
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Tab. 1.2: Functional limitations
Variable Question
Lower Body Mobility
RwWALKS Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty with walking several blocks?
RwJOG
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with running or jogging about a
mile?
RwSIT (Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with sitting for about two hours?
RwCHAIR
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with getting up from a chair after
sitting for long periods?
RwCLIMBS
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with climbing several flights of
stairs without resting?
Upper Body Agility
RwSTOOP
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with stooping, kneeling, or
crouching?
RwARMS
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with reaching or extending your
arms above shoulder level?
RwPUSH
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with pulling or pushing large
objects like a living room chair?
RwLIFT
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with lifting or carrying weights
over 10 pounds, like a heavy bag of groceries?
RwDIME
(Because of a health problem do you have any difficulty) with picking up a dime from a
table?
Activities of daily living (ADL)
RwBATH
(Because of a health or memory problem do you have any difficulty with) bathing or
showering?
RwEAT
(Because of a health or memory problem do you have any difficulty with) eating, such as
cutting up your food?
RwBED
(Because of a health or memory problem do you have any difficulty with) getting in or out
of bed?
RwDRESS (Because of a health or memory problem, do you have any difficulty) dressing?
RwWALKR (Because of a health or memory problem, do you have) walking across a room?
RwTOILT (Because of a health or memory problem, do you have) any difficulty using the toilet?
Name of the variable column shows the names as recorded in RAND database.
Finally, to measure consumption, I use spending data from RAND-CAMS version D,
which is based on the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) supplement to the
HRS data. Its main focus is to measure total household spending. It covers about 20% of the
HRS respondents and asks detailed information on durables, non-durables, transportation,
and housing. I employ a flexible, semi-parametric method using income, wealth, change in
wealth, education, size of the household, physical health, marriage status, and gender, to
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calculate the household consumption for the observations with missing values.
1.4 Estimation
Estimation of the dynamic discrete choice models, like the one suggested in this study,
involves finding the optimum path for each possible state of the world and requires the eval-
uation of all the possible paths for each point of the state space to find the best one. Such
evaluation usually can be achieved by solving a Bellman equation for the problem and is
called full solution method. However, the computational cost of the full solution method
is high and can be infeasible when the model incorporates a high dimensional, large state
space. This problem is called the curse of dimensionality and refers to the fact that by
adding one new dimension to the state space the paths that researcher should evaluate for
each point of the state space is multiplied by the number of possible values of the new di-
mension. This problem is even more severe in dynamic optimization. Namely, if the size
of the different combinations which should be evaluated to find the optimum path for each
state is O(ST0 ), where S0 is state space before adding a new dimension and T is number of
periods that researcher allows the agents to look into the future, adding new dimension with
s1 new possible points increases the problem size to O((S0 ∗ s1)
T ).
To prevent the curse of dimensionality, the number of non-full solution methods were devel-
oped. Rust (1987) assumes a Markovian process with the conditional independence of the
state space (St) and unobserved preference shocks (ǫt), where flow utilities are additively
separable. This allows for choice specific value functions of the form shown by equation 1.9.
For the estimation purpose, I rely on the Conditional Choice Probability estimator
(CCP), suggested by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). Utilizing the computational advan-
tage of the CCP, compared with the full solution methods, I can estimate a complex model
with a high dimensional state space. Also, CCP can be combined with the Expectation
Maximization (EM) algorithm that allows for the fixed unobserved heterogeneity in the
model. Both of the computational inexpensiveness and the incorporation of the unobserved
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heterogeneity are appealing in the models of health insurance and retirement. However, the
computational advantage of the CCP is not costless. CCP is a data-intensive method and in
the lack of a database that covers the state space, relies on the smoothing techniques. Hotz
et al. (1994) show that when we rely on the nonparametric estimates of the choice proba-
bilities, smoothed estimators can reduce the bias. In this study, I utilize a large number of
observations, as well as smoothing techniques to address this concern.
CCP is a 2-stage maximum likelihood estimator and hence separates the coefficients of the
model into first stage coefficients which are the coefficients of the transition probabilities and
production functions, and second stage coefficients which appear in the utility function. In
what follows in this section, I explain the estimation method, as well as estimation results,
for each of the two stages.
1.4.1 Identification
To be able to predict the effect of a counterfactual policy (raising the Medicare Eligibility Age
in this study), structural estimations rely on the policy-invariant estimation of the structural
parameters in the model. The first problem to address is the Lucas critique in the Brunner,
K. and Meltzer, A. (1983) that questions the validity of the marginal effect that is based
on the primitives which are themselves a function of policy intervention. The treatment
understudied in this paper (receiving Medicare health insurance) is not a function of states
(such as health status) and decisions (Labor supply and health behaviors) of individuals and
hence estimating the utility parameters and beliefs are independent of the treatment. In
other words, As a result, the choice of treatment serves as an identification assumption as
discussed by Khwaja, A. (2010).
While the policy-invariant estimate of the marginal effect is the necessary condition
of the validity of the counterfactual analysis, it is not sufficient. Another problem of so-
called the identification problem in the structural estimation argues the sensitivity of the
marginal effects to the parameters of the model. The identification problem occurs when the
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observational likelihood of the two different sets of structural parameters (primitives) are
equal, or in other words, two sets of primitives are doing equally well in fitting the data and
parameter sets cannot be ranked by evaluating their goodness of fit. This problem is vital
noting that two different sets of parameters with the same performance in the in-sample
goodness of fit might produce different out-of-sample predictions.
To address the problem of identification, I control for two sources of endogeneity: First
is the model endogeneity that emerges from the relationship between contemporaneous vari-
ables. The second source of endogeneity is the endogeneity from the initial conditions that
refer to the unobserved decisions individuals already have made through life which have led
them to the states that are observed by the researcher for the first time in the sample when
people are in their midlife.
1.4.1.1 Model Endogeneity
Functional specification of the relationship between different contemporaneous state variables
along with the detailed timing ( explained in Section 1.2.2 and Figure 1.2.2), are imposed
for better identification. However, while the timing convention reduces the identification
problem for the variables with the intertemporal relationship, it is not useful when the endo-
geneity is derived from the contemporaneous relationships. To address the contemporaneous
endogeneity, I rely on the functional assumptions and two sources of exogenous variations in
my model. I utilize the business cycle shocks as the first source of exogenous variation that
affects the stochastic interest rate and the probability of involuntary layoff and introduces
exogenous variations in the time dimension. For the business cycles, I use different periods
of recessions in the U.S. as reported by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee. The
second source of exogenous variation is through the involuntary layoff. HRS dataset indi-
cates involuntary layoff for an individual if the person is not working in the same job as used
to work in the previous wave, and reports the reason as ”involuntary layoff” or ”business
closure.” However, the relationships between mental health and physical health and the in-
38
voluntary layoff might still suffer from reverse causality, i.e., while involuntary layoff affects
the probability of being in the poor mental and physical health, person’s health also affects
the probability of receiving an involuntary layoff shock. I utilize the Current Population
Survey data (CPS) to calculate the industry level job separation rate in each census region
for every period, and employ this rate as an instrument for the probability of involuntary
job loss for individual at time t, who works in particular industry j and lives in a census
region cr, to isolate the effect of involuntary layoff on the mental and physical health. This
procedure works as the inter-state exclusion restriction and improves the model identification
by detaching the link from different health dimensions to the labor supply decisions.
While I use two sources of exogenous variation, the identification power which is intro-
duced by them can be more than what we would expect in a static model. As discussed in the
Proposition 1 of Bhargava (1991), utilizing the cross-equation restrictions when exogenous
time-varying variables are introduced into the model in every period can provide additional
identification conditions and less demanding identification sufficient condition, as opposed
with the sufficient condition stating the number of time-invariant exogenous variables should
be greater than time-varying endogenous variables. In the long panels, exogenous variations
of the time-varying instruments are transmitted to the next period when the evolution of the
endogenous variables follows a Markovian process and as a result instruments in the different
periods have separate effects on the endogenous variables, and it leads to the multiplicity
of instruments. In this study business cycles interacts with the region and industry that
individual is associated with them and leads to the much more exclusion restriction than
involuntary layoff alone.
Also, Mroz and Savage (1998) argue the non-linearities in the dynamics of the contempo-
raneous variables can provide even further moment conditions than what is expected from
the lagged variables in the Markovian process.
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1.4.1.2 Initial Conditions
Without any adjustments, initial conditions9 introduce bias in the estimation of the struc-
tural parameters, if heterogeneities which are not modeled (unobserved heterogeneities) in-
teracting with the decisions which were made through life cycle, before the observed periods
and determine the initial conditions. In the Health and Retirement Study data which I use in
this paper, individuals are interviewed for the first time when they are at least 50 years old.
As a result, observed initial characteristics of the people in the sample are not exogenous.
The initial observed states are based on the decisions that people made in life before entering
into the sample, and as a result, not addressing the initial condition problem produces the
biased estimates of the parameters and hence the marginal effects. To resolve this problem,
I follow Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and estimate the unobserved heterogeneities
conditional on the initial conditions.
1.4.2 Estimation Method
1.4.2.1 Simulated Value Function (SV)
Assuming the Additive Separability (AS) of the flow utility and the preference shocks, and
Conditional Independence (CI) between the state (St) and preference shocks, the full infor-
mation maximum likelihood estimator θ can be defined as:
θˆ = argmax
θ
l(θ) =
A∏
a=1
Ta∏
t=1
Pr(Dat |S
a
t , θf , θu)f(S
a
t |S
a
t−1, D
a
t−1, θf )
This likelihood function is separable and can be estimated in two separate steps. Calling it
2-stage maximum likelihood, the parameters which govern the transition probabilities (θf )
can be estimated at first, and then given the estimated parameters of the first stage (θˆf ),
the parameters in the utility function (θu) will be estimated using a likelihood function
that utilizes the choice probabilities, Pr(Dat |S
a
t , θ). As discussed by McFadden (1981) and
9 The conditions which are observed for the first time when individual enters the data set
40
Rust (1987), If preference shock is an IID extreme value distribution, Conditional choice
probabilities can be written as follows:
Pr(Dt|Xt) =
1∑
Dt
exp(ν(St, Dt)− ν(St, dt))
As a result, reaching the consistent estimate of θu involves calculating of the choice specific
value functions as described in equation 1.9. However, even by utilizing the Bellman’s
principle of optimality, this process is computationally expensive. Hotz and Miller (1993)
show that if preference shock is an IID extreme value distribution and CI and AS are satisfied,
the difference between choice specific value functions can be defined as a function of the
conditional choice probabilities P (Dt|St). More specifically, the difference between the value
of choosing decision D and an anchor decision 1 can be written as:
∆νˆ(S,D) = log{
P (D|S)
P (1|S)
}
This mapping between decision space and preference is helpful to reveal the difference be-
tween the choice specific value functions without pursuing the backward induction procedure
which is required in the full solution method of estimation. Hotz et al. (1994) introduce the
simulated value (SV) function estimator that is a smooth function of the structural parame-
ters θ. The idea behind SV estimator is to use a non-parametric estimation to get consistent
estimate of Conditional Choice Probabilities and then inverting them to obtain the value
function which is normalized by an anchor choice (∆ ν̂(x, d) = ν(x, d)− ν(x, do)).
Ideally, we can use a bin estimator of p(Dt|St) as a completely non-parametric estimate
that gives us the probability of each choice in every state. But data limitations force us to
employ some smoothing techniques. For this purpose, I smooth the surface of conditional
choice probabilities by employing a flexible functional form including quadratic terms and
interactions of state variables in a logistic platform. For transition probability of stochastic
state variables f(St|St−1, Dt−1), I employ sets of the Multinomial Logistic models with lagged
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variables, and other controls as explanatory variables. The algorithm to apply the SV
estimator of Hotz et al. (1994) as described by Rust (1994) is based on knowing the transition
probabilities of stochastic state variables or individual beliefs, f(St|St−1, Dt−1) and CCP
estimates of Pˆ (D |. S). Then the Simulation Algorithm is defined as follows:
1. Calculating ∆ ν̂(x, d)= log{ Pˆ (d|.x)
Pˆ (1|.x)
} [Hotz and Miller (1993)]
2. Then for each state, choice pair (data points) and each person in each period, use
(xnt , d
n
t ) as the initial point and:
(a) Given (xt−1, dt−1) draw xt from previously estimated π(xt|xt−1, dt−1)
(b) Given xt from previous step draw ǫt from assumed q(ǫt |. xt) [EV1] and keep them
as ǫ˜t
(c) Calculate dt = δ̂(x, ǫ) = argmaxd∈D(x) [∆ ν̂(x, d) + ǫ(d)]
(d) Repeat until reaching terminal period (or until time preference makes the next
period’s effect infinitesimal).
3. Now that we have simulated values of (x˜t, d˜t), using each initial value from step 2,
compute the simulated value function for each θ:
ν˜θ(x0, d0) =
T∑
t=0
βt{uθ[x˜t, δ̂(x˜t, ǫ˜t)] + ǫ˜t}
4. Knowing the simulated choice specific values, νθ(S0, D0), I can form the conditional
choice probabilities as a smooth function of θu:
P˜ r(Dt|Xt, θu) =
1∑
Dt
exp(∆ν˜(S0, D0))
And estimate the second stage likelihood estimator of θu:
˜ˆ
θu = argmax
θu
L(θu) =
A∑
a=1
Ta∑
t=1
Log[P˜ r(Dat+1|S
a
t+1, θu, θˆf )]
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Since the simulated paths are sensitive to the simulated preference shocks ǫ˜t, I need
to repeat the process above for each observation a to acquire a consistent estimator of
θu. In this study, I expand each observation to 10 observations. Thus the maximum
likelihood estimator averages over the ǫ˜t and corrects for the possible bias.
The estimation method used in this paper is based on the 2-stage maximum likelihood and
allows for incorporating fixed and unobserved heterogeneity types. Next section provides
the adjustment in the likelihood function that is needed for this purpose.
1.4.2.2 Incorporating the Unobserved Heterogeneity
Following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) I use the modified Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithm to address the fixed, unobserved heterogeneity. EM iterates over two steps. In the
Expectation step, the probabilities of choosing each alternative conditional on the observed
and unobserved states are updated. The maximization step can be done assuming the unob-
served states are observed and using the probabilities of each alternative conditional on being
in particular unobserved state as weights. The full explanation of the estimation method,
consisting the Simulation Value function estimator and Conditional Choice Probability that
allows for the unobserved heterogeneity in the model are discussed in details in the Appendix
B.
1.4.2.3 Policy Sensitive Value Functions
The value functions calculated by utilizing the CCP estimation method, are not sensitive
to the change in policy. It is because they are non-parametric functions of the data and in
particular related to the relative frequencies of the observed decisions. Since the sample is
fixed under the current policy, value functions cannot be recalculated for the counterfactual
policy.
This problem can be solved by solving the Bellman’s equations recursively for the esti-
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mated values of the structural parameters and assigning the new value to each point in the
state space, under each counterfactual policy. Starting from the terminal period T , each state
receives a vector of values where the elements are associated with each decision available at
the state, determined by the current utility (assuming there is no period ahead). Then the
best decision is chosen based on the maximum value that can be reached. This optimum
value then is assigned as the state and is called the value of state at T . Then moving one
step back to the period T − 1, the expected value of each decision will be calculated for each
state by employing the transition probability matrix and the values calculated for the period
T . These expected utilities need to be added to the current period’s utility associated with
each decision. Then we proceed by finding the maximum value that can be acquired from
different available decisions. This process should be repeated until the value of the state
is not changing by going backward in time. By repeating this backward induction for each
counterfactual policy, I can assign a policy specific value function for each state.
Since I have already estimated the structural parameters by utilizing the non-full-solution
estimation technique (CCP), it is not required to search over the parameter space to find
the parameters which are optimally explaining the sample. However, I need to solve the
Bellman’s equation once for each counterfactual policy. Note that solving Bellman’s equation
by backward induction involves the curse of the dimensionality problem which was discussed
earlier and adds exponentially to the computational expense. Considering the number of
dimensions that the model in this study introduces, I have a large state space that makes
the direct solution to the Bellman’s equation infeasible.
To reduce the computational complexity and to be able to solve the Bellman’s equation,
I follow the interpolation based approximation technique suggested by Keane and Wolpin
(1994). The technique involves the estimation based interpolation at every step of the
backward induction. Starting at the terminal period T , approximation involves taking J
draws from the joint distribution of the decision specific preference shocks and calculating
the maximum value of the value functions over the decision space. Utilizing the Monte Carlo
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integration, it is possible to reduce the computational expense even more, by simulating
the choice of specific value functions. Interpolation is based on the ordinary least squares
regression of the ex-ante value functions and choice specific value functions. Then the values
of the non-chosen points in the state space can be estimated.
While the interpolation technique makes it possible to assign values to each point of the
state space, it involves the approximation at every step of the backward induction problem
and increases the probability of the identification problem, by assigning same values to the
points in the state space for a different set of the estimated parameters. This problem is more
severe if the interpolation function does not support enough curvature, and is directly related
to the number of the points one chooses for the exact calculation of the value functions. I
alleviate this problem by avoiding approximation at every step of the backward induction,
and use the interpolation only when I reach the time zero in the backward induction.
I avoid the curse of dimensionality by only limiting state space size to the states which
are observed in the data and the states which can be reached highly likely from the observed
states. I assume the observed states are those who are highly likely to be reached from
the other states, and those states that are not observed are not likely to be reached in the
society that I study. Adding the other highly likely states to the set of states I use in the
backward induction process, is to increase the flexibility of the simulations when I study
the marginal effects of the counterfactual policies. It is important to note that even after
directly calculating the values of all observed and highly likely states, the Keane and Wolpin
(1994) interpolation technique is crucial to the simulation because it provides the value to
the states that might be reached in the forward simulation of each counterfactual policy.
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1.4.3 Structural Estimation Results
1.4.3.1 First Stage: Transitions and Production Functions
Estimation of the transition probabilities and production functions follows the timing of the
model that was discussed in section 1.2.2. The probability of transitioning from one point in
a particular dimension of the state space to another point is modeled as multinomial logistic
regression. Then assuming independence between different dimensions of the state space,
probability of transitioning from one point of the state space to another can be calculated by
multiplying the estimated probabilities in each dimension 10. I avoid imposing the theory to
the regression functions unless the channels are clear either by the nature of the transition
or by abundant evidence in the literature. However, I impose a detailed structure into the
timing of the model as discussed previously. The specification of each logistic regression and
its index function and the estimated probabilities are discussed in the Appendices A and C,
respectively.
1.4.3.2 Second Stage: Utility Parameters
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results, for the parameters of the utility function 1.1 which
are estimated in the second stage.
Propensity for Leisure: There are three types of unobserved heterogeneity. All three
types show the positive trend in the propensity for leisure as individuals grow older and
their health deteriorates. However, the positive association between increase in age and
health deterioration and propensity for leisure weakens as the unobserved heterogeneity
type is changing from type one to type tow and three respectively, meaning leisure is
10 Knowing that individual has Medicare and is 60 years old, the probability of transitioning to the state
with Medicare (P [iMedt+1 = 1|i
Med
t = 1)] = 1) and being 58 (P [At+1 = 58|At = 60] = 0) is zero:
P [iMedt+1 = 1, At+1 = 58|i
Med
t = 1, At = 60] = P (i
Med
t+1 = 1|P (i
Med
t = 1)).P (At+1 = 58|At = 60)
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becoming more desirable for type one in older ages and worse physical health, than type
two and type three. The effect of this association cannot be interpreted directly without
taking into account the dynamic and highly non-linear nature of the problem, but one
can roughly conclude that individuals with the type one unobserved heterogeneity tend
to work less as they are getting older and their health deteriorates, compared with the
type two and type three. For type three, deterioration in health has a positive effect on
the propensity for leisure. However, the effect is not statistically different from zero.
Considering the fact that leisure takes three values: 0, 1/2 and 1, small values for
γL in all three unobserved heterogeneity types indicate a large difference in utility,
between working full-time job (L = 1) and two other possible decisions toward labor
supple (part-time job and retirement). In another words, individuals do not distinguish
between retirement and part-time job as much as they distinguish between full-time job
and part-time job. As a result, there is a jump in utility level, as individual changes
his choice from full-time job to any of the other two choices. This gap in utility is
smaller for type one unobserved heterogeneity than the other two types.
Propensity to Consume: Consumption has positive utility for all three unobserved
heterogeneity types, as expected by the consumer theory. Determined by θc (slope) and
γc (curvature) in Table 1.3, individual with type one unobserved heterogeneity enjoys
consumption less than type two and type two enjoys it less than type three. However,
the increments in the consumption are more distinct for those with type one unobserved
heterogeneity than type two or three. The combination of the two competing effects
of slope and curvature shows that marginal propensity to consume is higher for the
individual with type one unobserved heterogeneity. Changing the consumption from
lowest possible normalized value (1
6
) to the maximum consumption level (1) increases
the utility by 3.55 times for the type one unobserved heterogeneity compared with
2.47 for the type three unobserved heterogeneity. Disregarding the complex dynamic
in the decision making process where the present discounted value of the future utilities
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determines individual’s decision, it is possible to say that individuals with the type one
unobserved heterogeneity are more sensitive toward changes in consumption than those
with type two or type three unobserved heterogeneity. However, individuals with type
three and type two unobserved heterogeneity are more likely to favor decisions which
promote more consumption on average (determined by the slope parameter θc).
Health behaviors: Health behaviors are represented in the model using smoking (s) and
exercise (e). Shown by φs and φe, both smoking and exercise gain relative importance in
individual’s decision making process. For example, individual who distastes smoking
is more hesitant to smoking as he gets older. Individuals show different attitudes
toward health behaviors depending on the unobserved heterogeneity types. θs and θe
indicate this attitude. Those individuals with the type one unobserved heterogeneity
dislike smoking while indifferent about exercise and can be categorized as healthy type.
Those with type two unobserved heterogeneity enjoys smoking and dislikes exercise and
I call them unhealthy type. Individuals with the third unobserved heterogeneity type
dislikes both smoking and exercise.
Bequest Preference and Discount Factor: Unobserved heterogeneity type determines
individual’s tendency toward bequest. Tracked by λ, agents with type one unobserved
heterogeneity appreciate positive bequest values, while the other types do not enjoy
the bequest. The discount factor (inter-temporal time preference) is about the same
for all types of unobserved heterogeneity and is 0.856, 0.86 , and 0.857 for unobserved
heterogeneity type one, two ,and three, respectively. In another words, discounted
present value of one unit of utility in 20 periods (40 years) is translated to 0.044, 0.49,
and 0.045 for the three unobserved heterogeneity types.
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Tab. 1.3: Utility Parameters Estimates
Parameter δ = 1 δ = 2 δ = 3
φ¯ -1.235 -1.235 -1.235
(.103) (.103) (.103)
φ0δ -1.177 -0.185 0.703
(.177) (.093) (.107)
φAδ 2.238 1.692 0.985
(.194) (.14) (.301)
φh
p
δ 1.012 0.373 0.006
(.164) (.194) (.143)
γLδ 0.183 0.174 0.192
(.072) (.183) (.124)
θcδ 0.083 0.104 0.185
(.043) (.029) (.043)
θsδ -1.046 0.468 -0.347
(.002) (.07) (.105)
θeδ 0.009 -0.152 -0.321
(.173) (.042) (.009)
γcδ 1.380 1.162 2.070
(.146) (.043) (.215)
θ
prv
δ -1.268 -1.277 -1.931
(.013) (.22) (.416)
θ
emp
δ 0.951 0.170 0.324
(.007) (.063) (.01)
βδ 0.856 0.860 0.857
(.018) (.077) (.106)
λδ 0.092 0.001 0.001
(.013) (.03) (.122)
φprv 0.572 0.572 0.572
(.328) (.328) (.328)
φs 0.899 0.899 0.899
(.145) (.145) (.145)
φe 0.727 0.727 0.727
(.021) (.021) (.021)
N 26,110 13,102 26,562
Standard Deviations in parantheses
Utility parametrs estimates.
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1.5 Results
I discuss the results for men with 12 years of education. In what follows, I evaluate the in-
sample prediction power of the estimated model further more, by comparing the simulated
data and the data from HRS. This is done by looking at the moments of the two “samples”.
After verifying the in-sample credibility of the estimated model, I analyze the marginal effects
of the change in the policy by changing the Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69.
1.5.1 Evaluating the Moments
To evaluate how well the simulation matches the data I compare the simulated results based
on the current policy (Medicare Eligibility age at 65) and data from HRS using the uncon-
ditional means by age. I take the wave 5 of the HRS data that corresponds with the year
2000 and simulate it forward using the estimated utility function parameters evaluated for
using the current policy. As a result, I can compare the real panel data from HRS to the
simulated panel.
The moments are defined for each variable as the age-specific average of the observations.
For example, I calculate the average health status at age 54 for the HRS data and the
simulated data. To compare the two averages, I utilize the t-statistic for the null hypothesis
that states the two averages are equal. A summary of the results for the main outcomes are
provided in the Table D.1 and in Figure 1.2. As shown, the model is replicating the observed
data closely. The full evaluation of the moments is discussed in the Appendix D.
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Fig. 1.2: First moment comparison of the real data and simulated data under the current policy.
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1.5.2 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
After confirming the model’s performance in replicating the current policy (MEA at 65), I
run a simulation under the assumption that the counterfactual policy is in place and analyze
the effect of the counterfactual policy (MEA at 69). For this purpose, I employ a synthetic
sample of people who are 50 years old and weight this sample so that it represents the pool
of individuals who are 50 years old in the data. Calling this sample the weighted average
sample, I simulate it for 44 years, so that individuals in the sample will be 94 years old
if they stay alive in the simulation process. Note that, for age 85 and older there is not
enough data in the HRS dataset and hence simulating the model for more than 85 does
not provide reliable inference, especially since the estimation method I use to reveal the
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structural parameters is a data-intensive method and has a tendency to the sample average.
The effect of a change in the Medicare Eligibility Age (MEA) from 65 to 69 is analyzed
through different measures. Table 1.5 shows the expected values at age 50 while considers
the survival probability for every future period. Table 1.4 on the other hand, shows the mean
outcome for different age groups conditional on being alive during the reported age group.
Figure 1.3 shows the resulted lifetime path of the annual labor supply, probability of exercise,
number of doctor visits and the probability of dying, for both current and counterfactual
policies.
Fig. 1.3: The trajectory of the selected variables under current policy (MEA at 65) and counter-
factual policy (MEA at 69).
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To show the effect of a change in policy, the difference between the current policy trajec-
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tory and counterfactual policy trajectory is shown in figure 1.4. The difference is augmented
by the 95 % confidence interval and can be used to evaluate the effect of a change in policy
at different ages. As a result of the hypothetical change in policy, annual labor supply is
increasing. Individuals in the simulation pool on average tend to work more hours annually,
beginning at age 54. The gap between the labor supply under the two policies is increasing by
age and is maximum at age 64. The first row in the table 1.4 compares the expected average
total hours of work at age 50 under the two policies and indicates that under the counter-
factual policy men expected to work about 5000 hours more. This result will be followed
by an increase in consumption of about $ 28,500 and leads to higher assets accumulation
of about $ 10,100. Probability of exercise shows the same trend. Under the counterfactual
policy, individuals tend to be more active and exercise more for a large portion of their life.
The number of the doctor visits, on the other hand, is decreasing under the new policy for
the years in which, Medicare is delayed. This is consistent with the ex-post moral hazard,
as, given the existence of the ex-post moral hazard, we expect the reduction in the marginal
price of the medical services leads to increase in medical services utilization. Row six of
the table 1.4 shows the expected lifetime medical expenditure at age 50 under two regimes.
Expected lifetime medical expenditure is lower ($ about 4,800) under the counterfactual pol-
icy. The overall effect of the change in behaviors determines the health measures and among
them, the hazard of dying (probability of dying given individual is alive at a certain age) and
average health status. Under the counterfactual policy, the hazard of dying is decreasing.
Shown in row 9 of the table 1.4 men at age 50, are expected to live 0.5 year longer under
the counterfactual policy. This also affects the total social security benefits amount that is
expected to be collected by men at age 50. Rows 10 and 11 of he table 1.4 show the number
of years receiving social security benefits and its total amount. While the number of years
is lower under the new policy by 0.39 year, total social security benefits are increased by $
12,688 . This is because of the higher labor supply and delay in the social security age claim
under the counterfactual policy.
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Fig. 1.4: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on the
selected variables
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The whole analysis then is repeated for another simulation pool in which individuals
are set to have low assets and poor health. Figure 1.5 shows the marginal effects for the
two simulation pool of the weighted average sample and poor with poor health sample. By
utilizing the new simulation pool of poor individuals with poor health, the marginal effect
of the change in policy on the annual labor supply is shown to be unchanged. The hazard of
dying is decreased for poor individuals with poor health, but the effect is smaller compared
with the weighted average sample.
More detailed analysis of the results is provided in what follows.
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Fig. 1.5: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
selected variables
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1.5.2.1 Effect on Health Investment
This study investigates the effect of the change in the policy on the four health investment
variables. The probability of the exercise, probability of the smoking, number of night stays
in hospital and number of doctor visits.
• Probability of Exercise: The trajectories of the probability of the exercise (vigorous
activity) under the current and counterfactual policies are shown in the top-left graph
of the Figure 1.6. For the individuals in the simulation pool, the counterfactual policy
of MEA at 69 alters their optimal behavior toward pursuing an active lifestyle, and
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as a result, the probability of exercise is higher for them under the alternative policy
comparing to the current policy. It can be seen that as a response to not having access
to Medicare health insurance, the probability of exercise increases from .42 at age 50 to
.5 at the age of 80. While the counterfactual policy induces people to be more active as
they are getting older, under the current policy probability of exercise does not change
by age. The top-left panel of the Figure 1.7 shows that the difference between the
probability of exercise under two regimes is statistically significant and is increasing
by age. The gap is widening at a higher pace between age 65 to 72 and shows that the
immediate impact of the change in policy on the optimal behavior is higher than the
indirect effect that affects the optimal behavior through the forward-looking channel.
• Probability of Smoking: Decision to smoke is modeled directly in the model. The
top-right panel in the figure 1.6 provides the probability of smoking under two regimes
for different ages. For people older than 54, It is more likely to choose to smoke
under the counterfactual policy than the current one. After Age 66, this relationship is
stabilizes. However, the difference between the optimal behavior under the two policies
is not significantly different from zero after age 66, as depicted in the top-left panel of
the figure 1.7
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Fig. 1.6: The trajectory of the Health Investment variables under current policy (MEA at 65)
and counterfactual policy (MEA at 69).
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• Number of nights in Hospital: Unlike the exercise and smoking, number of nights
in the hospital is not modeled as the direct decision in this study. However, the
dynamic structure of the model enables the agents to affect the probability of staying
a particular number of nights in the hospital. As shown in column 5 of the Table 1.4
and the bottom-left graph of the Figure 1.6 number of nights in the hospital is affected
by the change in policy. Starting at age 65, individuals in the simulation pool begin to
utilize more of the hospital services under the current policy that reduces the cost of
accessing the medical services, than the counterfactual policy. The bottom-left panel
of the figure 1.7 provides a clearer view of the difference between the number of nights
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in hospital under two policies. While there is no statistically significant difference
between two regimes until age 60, as the effect of a change in the policy, agents are
utilizing fewer hospital services under the new regime.
• Number of Doctor Visits: The bottom-right panel of the Figure 1.6 shows the
number of doctor visits for different ages under the counterfactual and current policies.
Like the number of nights in hospital, the change in policy induces people to utilize
lower amounts of the medical services. However, unlike the number of nights in the
hospital, the gap which is initiated by the change in policy will be closed after the
immediate effect of policy disappears. This temporary effect of the change in policy
is shown more exactly in the bottom-right panel of the figure 1.7. While there is no
difference between the number of doctor visits before age 60, starting at age 62, agents
in the simulation pool are visiting doctor less frequently. The gap between the two
regime is reaching its maximum at age 70 and will be closer completely at age 76.
Column 4 of the Table 1.4 also shows the difference in the two policies for different
age groups conditional on being alive. The expected number of doctor visits for a
representative agent of the simulation pool at age 50 is shown in the column 4 of the
Table 1.5. Representative agent is expected to visit doctor 106.02 times under the
current policy in his life after age 50, while this number increases to the 105.15 under
the counterfactual policy. This increase in the number of doctor visits can be explained
by the increase in life expectancy under the counterfactual regime. Note that expected
number of Doctor visits, uses the survival probabilities to provide expected values and
hence is not equal to the number of doctor visits one can acquire by adding them
through simulated life.
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Fig. 1.7: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
different measures of Health Investments
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Tab. 1.4: Average effects of change in the policy
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84
Hours of Work MEA : 65 1,369.307 1,237.003 653.902 325.312 306.780 315.946 291.935
MEA : 69 1,358.392 1,256.101 1,120.242 550.000 431.546 414.087 370.643
-(00.86) (00.91) (29.04) (08.36) (05.71) (03.22) (03.14)
Assets MEA : 65 65.745 65.745 70.589 70.589 106.309 106.309 118.449
MEA : 69 65.802 65.802 76.062 76.062 122.096 122.096 136.366
(00.02) (00.07) (01.54) (02.80) (03.05) (02.35) (02.22)
Consumption MEA : 65 45.746 45.011 45.591 45.148 44.697 45.167 42.479
MEA : 69 45.985 45.239 45.239 45.883 45.197 45.845 42.734
(00.62) (00.37) -(00.82) (01.13) (01.11) (00.90) (00.41)
Doctor Visits MEA : 65 2.468 2.815 2.961 3.411 3.562 3.674 3.414
MEA : 69 2.457 2.797 2.917 3.063 3.471 3.606 3.429
-(00.20) -(00.24) -(00.83) -(04.68) -(01.65) -(00.84) (00.22)
Hospital MEA : 65 0.148 0.121 0.167 0.258 0.295 0.407 0.392
MEA : 69 0.149 0.124 0.157 0.216 0.274 0.376 0.350
(00.07) (00.23) -(00.95) -(02.35) -(01.34) -(01.09) -(01.87)
Total Medical MEA : 65 6.159 7.350 9.141 10.839 11.217 14.243 12.575
Expenditure MEA : 69 6.181 7.409 8.931 10.624 10.758 13.779 11.952
(00.10) (00.20) -(00.81) -(00.46) -(01.45) -(00.78) -(01.43)
Health MEA : 65 1.745 1.797 2.012 2.337 2.808 3.394 4.023
MEA : 69 1.735 1.797 1.991 2.247 2.676 3.268 3.911
-(00.40) -(00.02) -(00.60) -(01.61) -(02.55) -(01.70) -(01.82)
CES-D MEA : 65 0.958 0.726 0.689 0.686 0.577 0.588 0.518
MEA : 69 0.943 0.733 0.661 0.637 0.541 0.541 0.477
-(00.41) (00.16) -(01.06) -(01.11) -(01.34) -(01.19) -(01.25)
Life Expectancy MEA : 65 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93
MEA : 69 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.94
(00.00) (00.00) (00.84) (00.87) (00.54) -(00.16) (00.74)
Probability of MEA : 65 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.870 0.948 0.968 0.929
Receiving SSB MEA : 69 0.000 0.000 0.295 0.781 0.940 0.968 0.935
-(07.70) -(06.02) -(01.20) -(00.07) (00.72)
SSB MEA : 65 0.000 0.000 3.915 6.490 6.480 6.525 6.212
MEA : 69 0.000 0.000 4.068 6.972 6.981 6.990 6.696
(04.67) (06.14) (07.02) (05.00) (05.12)
Probability of MEA : 65 0.598 0.602 0.576 0.542 0.462 0.397 0.307
Being Married MEA : 69 0.597 0.599 0.574 0.516 0.442 0.374 0.297
-(00.08) -(00.15) -(00.13) -(01.20) -(01.11) -(00.95) -(00.53)
t-statistics in parentheses
For each outcome, the first two rows are the outcome under the current (MEA: 65) or counterfactual policy (MEA: 69). Values
in parentheses are t-statistics of the null hypothesis, H0 : E(XMEA :65|Age) = E(XMEA :69|Age). The effects under the current
and the counterfactual policies are simulated by employing the pool of individuals at age 50 and weight for other characteristics
to reflect the population of 50 years old in the sample. The pool size is 3000 and the simulation is continued for 40 years.
1.5.2.2 Effect on Health
For the health-related outcomes, I look at the physical and mental health status, the number
of medical conditions and probability of dying.
• Physical Health: Physical health is measured using the index which is informed
by the objective binary responses to the functional limitation questions and varies
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between 1 (excellent health) to 5 (poor health). The top-left panel in the Figure
1.8 shows the trajectories of the physical health under two policies. For the agents
in the simulation pool, living under the counterfactual policy regime induces better
physical health compared to the current policy. The top-right panel of the Figure 1.9
shows that this gap is increasing by age and is statistically different from zero in 95 %
confidence level. Better physical health can be explained by the more active lifestyle
in the counterfactual regime. Column 7 of the Table 1.4 shows the average physical
health under two regimes for different age groups. While the health status is better
under the counterfactual policy than the current one, for the individuals at age 50,
the average expected lifetime health status is not large between the two regimes. This
result is shown in column 7 of the Table 1.5.
• Mental Health: Mental health is measured using the CES-D index and also reported
here by the probability of depression. The bottom-right graph in the figure 1.8 shows
the probability of depression under the two policies and indicates that the probability
of depression is lower under the counterfactual regime than the current regime. The
gap between the depression probability under two regimes is initiated at age 54 and
widens until age 84. Only attempts to closing the gap between age 54 and 84 is at the
time of implementation of the new policy, between age 65 and 69. Then, again the gap
persists. It might reflect the important tole that health insurance plays to provides
financial stability and reduction of stress related diseases like depression. The gap is
shown in the bottom-right panel of the figure 1.9. While the probability of depression
is different under the two policies, the difference in the CES-D measure under the two
regimes is not statistically different than zero. This is shown in the column 8 of the
Table 1.4 and 1.5
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Fig. 1.8: The trajectory of the Health variables under current policy (MEA at 65) and counter-
factual policy (MEA at 69).
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• Number of Health Conditions: Number of health conditions varies between 0 and
8 and provides another health status measure that covers more severe health problems
which are not necessarily affect the functional limitation of the person. The number of
health conditions under the two policies is shown in the top-right panel of the Figure
1.8. People are experiencing a slightly fewer number of health conditions under the
counterfactual regime than the current one. There s no difference in the number of
health conditions until age 62. Starting at age 64 the difference in the number of health
conditions under the different policies is significantly different from zero and the gap
is widening until age 72 and is stable after age 74, as shown in the top-right panel of
62
the Figure 1.9.
• Probability of Dying: Probability of dying is an objective measure of health that
integrates all the other health measures and also affects the aggregate level of the other
important variables of the model through the life expectancy. The bottom-right graph
in the Figure 1.8 shows the probability of dying for both current and counterfactual
policies. Individuals in the simulation pool have the average probability of dying 0
at age 50. The probability increases under both regimes as individuals are getting
older and reach around .5, for the current and alternative policies respectively. The
bottom-right panel of the Figure 1.9 indicates that the gap between the effect of two
policies appears at age 64 and grows until age 84. The probability of dying is .01
percentage point lower for the people at age 84 who are living under the counterfactual
regime (MEA at 69) comparing to the current regime (MEA at 65). The probability
of dying can be translated to the life expectancy. The life expectancy under the two
different regimes is shown in column 9 of the Table 1.5 and indicates that people are
on average living .46 years longer under the counterfactual regime than the current
regime. This difference in the life expectancy explains the puzzling differences in the
medical expenditure, number of doctor visits, and physical health status under the
different policies.
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Fig. 1.9: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
different measures of Health
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Tab. 1.5: Expected value of the outcome at age 50
Variable MEA : 65 MEA : 69 Difference
Total Hours of Work 22,420.17 27,500.87 5,080.70
(208.42) (262.41) (34.28)
Assets 97,807.99 107,930.57 10,122.58
(116.44) (125.91) (9.46)
Total Consumption 1,506,692.17 1,535,095.64 28,403.47
(363.46) (379.49) (4.97)
Total Doctor Visits 106.02 105.15 -0.87
(296.34) (296.66) -(1.73)
Total Hospital 8.47 7.97 -0.51
(150.52) (147.96) -(6.67)
Total Medical Expenditure 342,173.91 337,321.74 -4,852.17
(223.78) (230.17) -(2.34)
Health 5.45 5.28 -0.17
(508.35) (496.66) -(6.22)
CES-D 0.68 0.65 -0.03
(195.39) (190.) -(4.36)
Life Expectancy 33.01 33.46 0.46
(385.09) (394.88) (3.83)
Number of Years Receiving SSB 18.84 18.46 -0.39
(224.55) (224.31) -(3.32)
Total SSB 137,342.61 150,031.30 12,688.70
(216.62) (225.69) (13.5)
Number of years being married 16.17 16.02 -0.15
(151.08) (151.93) -(1.61)
t-statistics in parentheses
Values in parantheses are t-statistics of the null hypothesis, H0 : E(XData|Age) = E(XSimulatied|Age)
1.5.2.3 Effect on Labor Supply
Labor supply is measured by the annual hours of work, the probability of working full time,
the probability of working part-time and the probability of not working. The Annual hours
of work for both policies are shown in the top-left graph of the Figure 1.10, where continuous
line shows the current policy of MEA at age 65 and dashed line is the counterfactual policy
of MEA at age 69. The divergence in the annual hours of work begins at age 54. People
are working for more hours annually under the counterfactual policy regime and the gap is
higher as individuals in the simulation pool are getting older. Most of the effect is caused
by the extensive margin where people stay in the full time job instead of getting retired
(stop working). Individuals tend to work more in the part-time job under the counterfactual
policy regime before age 70, and after age 70 this relation is stabilized. The top-left graph in
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Figure 1.11 shows that the difference is significant in 95 % confidence for hours of work, the
probability of working full time and the probability of not working, while the probability of
working part-time job is not statistically different from zero. First column in Table 1.4 shows
the average amount of hours of work for different 5-year age groups for those individuals in
the simulation pool who are alive in each age group. First column of the Table 1.5 shows the
expected lifetime hours of work for people at age 50. This result incorporates the probability
of being alive in the future periods and as a result, reflects the health level as well. While
under the current policy 50-year-old men are expected to work for 22,420 hours in their
remaining portion of the lifetime, the counterfactual policy induces them to work for more
5,080 hours which can be interpreted as three years of full-time work. Most of the difference
is due to the work during the transition period between current and counterfactual policy,
meaning age 60 to 69.
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Fig. 1.10: The trajectory of the Labor Supply variables under current policy (MEA at 65) and
counterfactual policy (MEA at 69).
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Fig. 1.11: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
Labor Supply
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1.5.2.4 Effect on the Monetary Variables
Consumption, Assets (wealth), Annual medical expenditure and the social security benefits
are the four monetary variables that we analyze.
• Consumption: Consumption level under the both regimes is shown in the top-left
graph of the Figure 1.12. Simulation results indicate that consumption is relatively
stabilized under both regimes and is not changing as the simulation pool is getting
older, however under the counterfactual regime consumption is higher for a considerable
portion of time, than the current policy regime. This accession in the consumption
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begins at age 66 and lasts until age 80. The top-left graph in the Figure 1.13 shows
that the gap is at it’s maximum at age 62 and stays almost constant until age 84. It
should be noted that the difference is not statistically significant before age 70 as is
shown in column 3 of the Table 1.4. The expected lifetime difference in consumption
under the two regimes for the average individual in the simulation pool at age 50 is $
28,403 which means that under the counterfactual regime, individuals are expected to
consume about one year worth of consumption more, comparing to the current policy
regime.
• Assets: Next monetary variable is the level of assets. The simulated trajectory of the
assets under two regimes is shown in the top-right part of the Figure 1.12. Individuals in
the simulation pool are accumulating lower levels of assets under the current regime.
The top-right graph in the Figure 1.13 shows that the gap begins at age 60 and is
expanding until age 69. Column 2 of the Table 1.5 shows that average level of assets
for the representative person in the simulation pool is 97,807 $ under the current regime
and 107,930 $ under the alternative regime.
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Fig. 1.12: The trajectory of the Monetary variables under current policy (MEA at 65) and coun-
terfactual policy (MEA at 69).
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• Medical Expenditure: Annual medical expenditure is increasing as individuals are
getting older, and it shares the same trajectory under both regimes until age 60. As
shown in the bottom-left part of the Figure 1.12, the gap in medical expenditure
begins to grow at age 60. Medical expenditure is lower for individuals who live under
the counterfactual regime in which they do not have access to the Medicare health
insurance before age 69, comparing to the same individuals who live under the current
regime. The bottom-left graph in the Figure 1.13, provides the difference in the medical
expenditure under the two regimes and shows that the gap which initially began to
appear at age 60, is growing through the lifetime and is statistically significant after age
70
68. Column 6 of the Table 1.5 shows that the expected lifetime medical expenditure
for individuals at age 50 is 4,852 less, under the counterfactual regime compared to the
current regime.
• Social Security Benefits: Social security benefit is the last monetary variable. The
bottom-right graph of the Figure 1.12 shows that the amount of social security benefit
that the average individual in the simulation pool receives under the alternative policy
is higher compared to the current regime. Starting at age 62, which is the early
retirement age, two policies induce different levels of social security benefits. The
reason can be seen in both working histories and postponing the social security benefits
claim. It is discussed under the labor supply title that counterfactual policy motivates
people to work more. Thus, individuals have more average income which will affect
the social security benefit amount they receive. Provided in column 10 of the Table 1.4
that shows the probability of receiving social security benefit under the two regimes
and in the different age groups, the probability of receiving social security benefits is
lower under the counterfactual policy. As a result, under the alternative policy, people
have higher average income in their recent work history at each age and also they delay
their social security claim, both of which increases the expected social security benefit
that they receive
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Fig. 1.13: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
different Monetary Variables
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1.5.2.5 Effect on Health Insurance
The decisions to purchase private health insurance and employer health insurance are mod-
eled directly as utility function variables. This study investigates the effect of the change
in Medicare Eligibility Age from age 65 to age 69. Purchasing private and employer health
insurance are the substitutes to the Medicare health insurance and should act as a buffer
to minimize the harmful effects of this change in policy for the individuals. This section
discusses the optimal response of the individuals to the change in policy through these two
instruments.
72
• Purchasing Private Health Insurance: The Left panel of the Figure 1.14 shows
the probability of purchasing private health insurance under each policy. Individuals
in the simulation pool are more likely to purchase private health insurance under the
counterfactual policy after age 65, comparing to the current policy. The probability is
statistically the same for both policies between age 50 to 65. The difference between
the probabilities and the statistical significance is shown in the left panel of the figure
1.15.
Fig. 1.14: The trajectory of the Health Insurance variables under current policy (MEA at 65)
and counterfactual policy (MEA at 69).
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• Purchasing Employer Health Insurance: Probability of purchasing the employer
health insurance is linked to the decision to work and is decreasing under both policies
as simulation pool is getting older. As shown in the right panel of the Figure 1.14,
the reduction in the probability of purchasing the employer health insurance by age
is occurring consistently at age of the implementation of Medicare policy. The right
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panel in the Figure 1.15 shows the difference in the probability under the two policies.
The gap in the likelihood of purchasing the employer health insurance is appearing at
age 64 and is widening steadily until age 69. At age 65 that is the Medicare Eligibility
Age under the current regime, the gap between the two policies is about six percentage
points. The gap reaches eight percentage point at around age 69.
Fig. 1.15: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
different Health Insurance Types
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1.5.3 Welfare Effect
The change in the Medicare Eligibility Age induces individuals to work for more hours
to compensate for the reduced access to Medicare health insurance. They also pursue a
healthier lifestyle by being more active (exercise). They experience better mental health
and consume more as health and consumption are complementary. However, losing the free
health insurance and working for more years and more hours are not beneficial. To evaluate
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the welfare effect of the change in Medicare Eligibility age from age 65 to 69, I calculate the
Willingness to Pay(WTP) of the change in policy.
I do this by calculating the willingness to pay for each individual between age 50 to 54 in
the sample. This is done by assigning the ex-ante value function for each individual under
the two different policies and searching for the change in the wealth that is required to make
the Present Discounted Utility of the counterfactual policy equal to the one for the current
policy. This change in wealth is interpreted as the willingness to pay and indicates the
maximum amount that an individual pays to have the new policy. A negative willingness to
pay means that individual prefers the current policy (MEA at 65) and to have him indifferent
between current and counterfactual policy, policymaker should compensate him (Willingness
To Accept). Figure 1.16 shows the willingness to pay for the four different health groups:
Excellent, very good, good ,and fair. Willingness to pay is negative for all the four groups and
this means that individuals need to be compensated to become indifferent between current
and the counterfactual policy. Otherwise, they prefer current policy. The Willingness to
pay is more negative as the health status is worsening and indicates people with poor health
dislike more the new policy. It can be explained by the value of the Medicare health insurance
for the people with poor health who are more likely to utilize the medical care services. For
people with excellent and very good health status, WTP is $ -140,733 and $ 1466,256 ,
respectively . WTP decreases to $ -163,235 for the people with good health status. For
people with fair and poor health WTP is on average $ -297,500 .
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Fig. 1.16: Calculated Willingness To Pay (Accept) for the proposed policy of delaying Medicare
Eligibility Age by four years.
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1.6 Conclusion
Raising the Medicare Eligibility Age has been discussed as a policy to help balance the
federal budget. The main concern in conducting such change in policy is the health and
welfare of the near retirement population. This study utilizes the out of sample prediction
power of the structural estimation models to address the effect of a raise in the Medicare
Eligibility Age. Blau and Gilleskie (2008), Scholz and Seshadri (2013), French et al. (2016)
and Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016) among others, have analyzed the effect of change in health
insurance on labor supply and health, by developing structural models. While, these models
of health and retirement can be utilized to address the effect of change in the Medicare
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Eligibility Age, the endogenous behavioral response of the individuals to such a change
in policy should be incorporated in the models. This study models the labor supply and
health investment behaviors of the men with 12 years of education by developing a model
in which health behaviors such as smoking and exercise and different health insurance types
are chosen by individuals and directly affect individual’s utility. Incorporating three types of
the unobserved fixed heterogeneity, the model under studied is flexible and sensitive to the
desired changes in the health insurance policy. This study employs the Conditional Choice
Probability (CCP) estimator suggested by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), and hence is able
to incorporate a large state space that allows for more detailed transition functions and
timing.
I find that raising the Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 leads to a higher level
of labor supply and higher life expectancy. However, the effect of the change in policy on
the welfare is negative and people on average ask for about $ 151,000 to accept the change
with those in poor health at age 50 needing nearly $ 297,500 to be compensated. I also
find some evidence of cost transfer from Medicare program to the Social Security program.
Men’s lifetime social security benefits increase by $ 12,688 that is due to the increase in labor
supply, postponing the social security benefits claim and, increase in the life expectancy.
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Appendix A
TRANSITIONS AND PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
Involuntary Layoff
Probability of receiving layoff shock is logistic function of previous period marriage status
(mt−1), tenure (x
1
t−1), income (yt−1) and current period economic environment (σ
e
t ). Defining
vector
−→
X σl :
−→
X l = [1,mt−1, x
1
t−1, yt−1, σ
e
t ]
Then define the probability of being in a specific mental health state as a logistic function
of the linear transformation of index:
Pr(σl =a|
−→
Xσl) =
exp(
−→
Xσl ×
−→
β′σl,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
Xσl ×
−→
β′σl,b))
∀ a ∈ {1}
(A.1)
Where,
−→
β σl is a 1× 5 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Tenure
Tenure can be an integer between zero and X¯1. I assume that tenure increases only if the
agent keeps the previous job. It will be zero if the person decides not to work and will be
two if the person starts working a new job. After layoff shock is revealed, If a layoff occurs,
tenure resets to zero, and if there is no layoff, x1,t remains same at the beginning of period
t and after the shocks. Finally, decision toward employment updates tenures value for the
next period.
x1,t =
0, if σt−1 = 1x1,t−1, otherwise (A.2)
Mental Health
Mental health is an integer between 0 and 8, with zero means excellent mental health and 8
means depressed. I assume logistic probability for the mental health shock. The probability
of being in one of the states of the mental health is function of previous period marriage
status, mental health, age, physical health, leisure, income, number of nights in hospital,
number of doctor visits, number of health conditions, assets, consumption, gender, education
and updated layoff shock . I define the index vector
−→
X hm :
−→
Xhm = [1,mt−1, h
m
t−1, At−1, h
p
t−1, Lt−1, yt−1, k
1
t−1, k
2
t−1, h
c
t−1, at−1, ct−1, g, E, σ
e
t ]
Then define the probability of being in a specific mental health state as a logistic function
of the linear transformation of index:
Pr(hmt =a|
−→
Xhm) =
exp(
−→
Xhm ×
−→
β′hm,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
Xhm ×
−→
β′hm,b))
∀ a ∈ {1, ..., 8}
(A.3)
Where,
−→
β hm is a 1× 15 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Experience and Tenure
If an individual decides to work (part-time or full-time), then both experience and tenure will
be added by 2. If an individual chooses not to work, tenure resets to zero, while Experience
will be unchanged.
Age and Medicare
Age increases by 2. Then Medicare will be one if updated age is greater than or equal the
Medicare eligibility age, and zero otherwise.
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Number of Nights in Hospital
After revealing insurance type, healthy behaviors, and income, I update the number of nights
in the hospital, using a shock with logistic distribution and conditional on a subspace of state
spate. Since data is concentrated at zero nights in the hospital, I set all the observations
with one and two nights in the hospital to be one. Also, because there are not enough
observations with more than three nights in the hospital, I set all observations with more
than three nights, equal to 3.
−→
Xk1 = [1,mt−1, h
p
t−1, At, yt, et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
The probability of spending a specific number of nights in the hospital is a logistic function
of the linear transformation of index:
Pr(k1t =a|
−→
Xk1) =
exp(
−→
Xk1 ×
−→
β′k1,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
Xk1 ×
−→
β′k1,b))
∀ a ∈ {1, 3}
(A.4)
Where,
−→
β k1 is a 1× 10 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Number of Doctor Visits
Updating procedure of the number of doctor visits follows the same procedure as the number
of nights in the hospital. Again, because of the data concentration around zero, I assume
three bins for the number of doctor visits, 0, 1 and five which implies all observations with
the number of doctor visits between 1 and four are set to 1 and all with the number of doctor
visits greater and equal 5, set to 5.
−→
Xk2 = [1,mt−1, h
p
t−1, At, yt, et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
I model the structure of shock as conditional logistic distribution. Thus, the probability of
the number of doctor visits is a logistic function of the linear transformation of index:
Pr(k2t =a|
−→
Xk2) =
exp(
−→
Xk2 ×
−→
β′k2,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
Xk2 ×
−→
β′k2,b))
∀ a ∈ {1, 5}
(A.5)
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Where,
−→
β k2 is a 1× 10 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Physical Health
Knowing the reactionary health investments, healthy behaviors, age, leisure and income,
individual receives the physical health shock. Using the same assumption for the structure
of the shock, I can update physical health status. Physical health status is an integer that
takes one of the values 1 through 6, with one as excellent health status and six as dead. The
index that physical health status is based upon is defined as:
−→
Xhp = [1,mt−1, h
p
t−1, h
c
t−1, at−1, g, E,At, Lt, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st]
Then the probability of being in each one of the six different values is:
Pr(hpt =a|
−→
Xhpt ) =
exp(
−→
Xhpt ×
−→
β′hpt ,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=1(exp(
−→
Xhpt ×
−→
β′hpt ,b))
∀ a ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
(A.6)
Where,
−→
β hp is a 1× 14 vector of coefficients and, 1 as the base category.
Number of Health Conditions
Individual also receives another health shock regarding the number of health conditions. I
use three bins for the number of health conditions which are 0, 1 and 3. As the number of
nights in the hospital and the number of doctor visits, the reason that I am using three bins
for the number of health conditions is the data concentration around 0. For each individual,
if the number of health conditions is 1 or 2, I set it to 1, and if it is greater than or equal 3, I
set it to 3. Then the number of health condition shock is conditional on a vector of variables
containing a subset of updated and un-updated state space:
−→
Xhc = [1,mt−1, h
c
t−1, h
p
t , At, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
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Then the probability of being in each one of the six different values is:
Pr(hct =a|
−→
Xhct ) =
exp(
−→
Xhct ×
−→
β′hct ,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
Xhct ×
−→
β′hct ,b))
∀ a ∈ {1, 3}
(A.7)
Where,
−→
β hc is a 1× 13 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Marriage Status
Marriage is not explicitly modeled as a decision in my model. Instead, I update marriage
status by endogenous shock. An individual can affect the probability of being married by
the decisions about labor supply and hence income, healthy behaviors such as smoking and
exercise and health insurance type which all are important in explaining one’s attractiveness
and also need for marriage. Marriage status is the dummy that is one if an individual is
married and zero otherwise. Endogenous marriage shock follows the logistic distribution
with a conditional mean that is a function of the linear transformation of a subspace of state
space. I define the index function of the logistic function as:
−→
Xm = [1,mt−1, h
p
t , h
c
t , At, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st, i
emp
t , i
prv
t , i
m
t ]
I model the structure of marriage shock as conditional logistic distribution. Thus, the
probability of the number of doctor visits is a logistic function of the linear transformation
of index:
Pr(mt =a|
−→
Xm) =
exp(
−→
Xm ×
−→
β′m,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
Xm ×
−→
β′m,b))
∀ a ∈ {1}
(A.8)
Where,
−→
β m is a 1× 13 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Social Security Benefit
Like marriage status, I do not explicitly model the decision for claiming the social security
benefits. I define a dummy variable for claiming social security benefit that takes value
one if individual claims the social security benefit and zero otherwise. Receiving social
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security benefits is absorbing state, which means, if an individual has not started to receive
the social security benefits, she can start claiming it in the current period by a probability
that is defined by the shock structure. But if an individual already receives social security
benefits, she continues receiving it. Receiving the social security variable gets an update by
a logistic type shock with mean that is a function of the subset of state space. As a result,
an individual can affect the probability of receiving social security benefits by affecting the
state space through decisions which are explicitly modeled. Since an individual cannot claim
social security benefits before reaching the early retirement age, I constrained the updating
procedure to be started after early retirement age and set receiving social security to be zero
for individuals younger than it. The vector of the relevant subset of the state space is:
−→
XSSB = [1, at−1, g, E,mt, h
m
t , h
p
t , h
c
t , At, Lt, yt, k
1
t , k
2
t , et, st, σ
e
t , ct] forAt ≥ f
Where f is the early retirement age. Social security benefit updating probability has a
conditional logistic distribution:
Pr(SSBt =a|
−→
XSSB) =
exp(
−→
XSSB ×
−→
β′SSB,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
XSSB ×
−→
β′SSB,b))
∀ a ∈ {1}
(A.9)
−→
β SSB is a 1× 13 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category. If an individual happens
to collect the social security benefits, its amount is determined deterministically, using a
linear transformation of the following vector:
−→
X ssb = [1,mt, ssbt−1, yt, g, x
1
t , x
2
t ] forAt ≥ f
Then depending At, I use one of the three sets of pre-estimated coefficients to determine
the social security benefits amount. More specifically:
βssb =

βssb,early, if At < f
βssb,full, if At = f
βssb,late, if At > f
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Knowing the relevant set of coefficients, I compute the social security amount as a linear
transformation:
βssb =

−→
X ssb ×
−→
β′ ssb, if SSBt−1 = 0
ssbt−1, if SSBt−1 = 1
Total Medical Expenditure
Total medical expenditure is a noisy measure, and it makes it hard to predict its amount. I
define a medical expenditure shock that improves the simulation of the variable. I assume
a conditional logistic distribution for the medical expenditure shock. This shock on top
of the physical health shock and number of health conditions shock which affect physical
health and number of health conditions respectively helps to better replication of the medical
expenditure. I discretize the continuous medical expenditure to seven bins of 0, 5, 10, 20, 30,
40, 50. The probability of facing one of the medical expenditure bins follows a multinomial
logistic formula. The index vector is:
−→
XME = [1,mt, h
p
t , h
c
t , At, k
1
t , k
2
t , g, E]
Then, for each individual, the probability of being hit by one of the medical expenditure
hits is a multinomial logistic:
Pr(MEt =a|
−→
XME) =
exp(
−→
XME ×
−→
β′ME,a)
1 +
∑
b 6=0(exp(
−→
XME ×
−→
β′ME,b))
∀ a ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50}
(A.10)
Where,
−→
β ME is a 1× 9 vector of coefficients and, 0 as the base category.
Interest Rate
I draw the interest rate (rt), in every period conditional on the economic environment
rt =
(−5%, 1%), if σ
e
t = 1
(−1%, 5%), if σet = 0
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This range replicates the interest rates in different periods of crisis in the U.S. as reported
by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee.
Assets
Knowing components of asset and their transitioning probabilities, I can construct the asset
at the end of the current period. Asset at the end of period t (at) is rebuilt by adding income
from working, social security benefit income and dividend from previous periods accumulated
asset that assumes to grow by the revealed interest rate (rt). Then, consumption, out-of-
pocket medical expenses, and different health insurance premiums are subtracted from asset:
at+1 = yt + at(1 + rt)
+ SSBt −OOPt − ct − ip
emp
t .i
emp
t − ip
prv
t .i
prv
t − ip
m
t .i
m
t
(A.11)
90
Appendix B
ESTIMATION METHOD
Simulated Value Function (SV)
Assuming Additive Separability (AS) of the preference shocks, agent i’s discounted lifetime
utility can be shown by:
T∑
t=1
βt−1.
(
u(Di,t, Si,t) + ǫ(Di,t)
)
(B.1)
Where β is discount factor, T is the terminal stage, ǫ is the choice specific preference shock
and Di,t and Si,t are respectively, decision and state of the individual i at time t. Individual’s
maximization problem then can be written as::
max
δ
{
E
[ T∑
t=1
βt−1[u(St, Dt) + ǫ(Dt)]
]}
Calling the future utilities, the value function, and defining it as the expected discounted
lifetime utility following current state and preference shock we have:
V (St, ǫt) = max
δ
{
E
[ T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−1[u(Sτ , Dτ ) + ǫ(Dτ )|St, ǫ(Dt)]
]}
Then Bellman’s principle of optimality can define the value function as:
V (St, ǫt) = max
Dt
[
u(St, Dt) + ǫ(Dt) + βE
(
Vt+1(St+1, ǫ(Dt+1)|St, Dt)
)]
or more specifically:
V (St, ǫt) =
∑
Dt
I[κt = Dt]
{
u(St, Dt) + ǫ(Dt)
+ β
∑
S
∫
ǫ
(
Vt+1(St+1, ǫ(Dt+1))g(ǫ(Dt+1))dǫ(Dt+1)
)
f(St+1|St, Dt)
}
Where κ is the decision rule. Next, we define ex ante value function by integrating out the
current period preference shock. Ex-ante value function defines the value of each state before
the preference shock is revealed:
V¯ (St) =
∫
ǫ
Vt(St, ǫ(Dt)).g(ǫ(Dt)).dǫ(Dt)
Having the ex-ante value function, we can define the choice specific value function ν(St, Dt),
that defines the value of choosing decision Dt while being in state St and acting optimally
for the future periods:
ν(Dt, St) = u(Dt, St) + β
∑
St
V¯ (St+1)f(St+1|Dt, St)
McFadden (1981) defines the social surplus function that is simply expected utility of choos-
ing a specific alternative::
G[{ν(St, Dt)|St}] =
∫
max
Dt
[{ν(St, Dt)|St}]g(ǫ(Dt))
Assuming AS and CI:
Pr(dSt+1, Dt+1) = Pr(Dt+1|St+1).f(dSt+1|St, Dt)
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Where conditional choice probability is:
Pr(Dt+1|St+1) =
σG[{ν(St, Dt)|St}]
σ{ν(St, Dt)|St}
Substituting the choice specific value functions, and given the observed panel, the full infor-
mation maximum likelihood estimator θ can be defined as:
θˆ = argmax
θ
l(θ) =
A∏
a=1
Ta∏
t=1
Pr(Dat+1|S
a
t+1, θ)f(S
a
t |S
a
t−1, D
a
t−1, θ)
We can reduce the number of parameters which require to be estimated in likelihood func-
tion by employing asymptotically normal and inefficient 2-stage procedure that separates
parameters into those which are appeared only in transition function f and others which
only appear in u, β and g. Hence the first stage and the second stage estimator can be
estimated separately. Where the first stage estimator θf is:
θˆf = argmax
θf
l(θf ) =
A∏
a=1
Ta∏
t=1
f(Sat |S
a
t−1, D
a
t−1, θf )
And the second stage estimator θu, is based on the assumption that the first stage estimated
parameters (θˆf ) are the truth:
θˆu = argmax
θu
l(θu) =
A∏
a=1
Ta∏
t=1
Pr(Dat+1|S
a
t+1, θu, θˆf )
Taking log from the above formula:
θˆu = argmax
θu
L(θu) =
A∑
a=1
Ta∑
t=1
Log[Pr(Dat+1|S
a
t+1, θu, θˆf )]
Reaching the consistent estimate of θu involves calculating of the choice specific value func-
tions by the solving the Bellman’s equation which is computationally expensive. As shown
by Rust (1987), If preference shock is an IID extreme value distribution, Conditional choice
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probabilities can be written as follows:
Pr(Dt|Xt) =
1∑
Dt
exp(ν(St, Dt)− ν(St, dt))
Hotz and Miller (1993) show that if preference shock is an IID extreme value distribution
and CI and As are satisfied, the difference between choice specific value functions can be
defined as a function of the conditional choice probabilities P (Dt|St). More specifically, the
difference between the value of choosing decision D and an anchor decision 1 can be written
as:
∆νˆ(S,D) = log{
P (D|S)
P (1|S)
}
Based on Hotz and Miller (1993), Hotz et al. (1994) introduce the simulated value (SV)
function estimator that is a smooth function of the structural parameters θ. The idea behind
SV estimator is to use a non-parametric estimation to get consistent estimate of Conditional
Choice Probabilities and then inverting them to obtain the value function which is normalized
by an anchor choice (∆ ν̂(x, d) = ν(x, d) − ν(x, do)). Ideally, we can use a bin estimator
of p(Dt|St) as a completely non-parametric estimate that gives us the probability of each
choice in every state. But data limitations force us to employ some smoothing techniques.
For this purpose, I smooth the surface of conditional choice probabilities by employing a
flexible functional form including quadratic terms and interactions of state variables in a
logit platform. For transition probability of stochastic state variables f(St|St−1, Dt−1), I
employ sets of the Multinomial Logistic models with lagged variables, and other controls
as explanatory variables. The algorithm to apply the SV estimator of Hotz et al. (1994)
as described by Rust (1994) is based on knowing transition probability of stochastic state
variables or individual beliefs, f(St|St−1, Dt−1) and CCP estimates of Pˆ (D |. S). Then the
Simulation Algorithm is defined as follows:
1. Calculating ∆ ν̂(x, d)= log{ Pˆ (d|.x)
Pˆ (1|.x)
} [Hotz and Miller (1993)]
2. Then for each state, choice pair (data points) and each person in each period, use
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(xnt , d
n
t ) as the initial point and:
(a) Given (xt−1, dt−1) draw xt from previously estimated π(xt|xt−1, dt−1)
(b) Given xt from previous step draw ǫt from assumed q(ǫt |. xt) [EV1] and keep them
as ǫ˜t
(c) Calculate dt = δ̂(x, ǫ) = argmaxd∈D(x) [∆ ν̂(x, d) + ǫ(d)]
(d) Repeat until reaching terminal period (or until time preference makes the next
period’s effect infinitesimal).
3. Now that we have simulated values of (x˜t, d˜t), using each initial value from step 2,
compute the simulated value function for each θ:
ν˜θ(x0, d0) =
T∑
t=0
βt{uθ[x˜t, δ̂(x˜t, ǫ˜t)] + ǫ˜t}
4. Knowing the simulated choice specific values, νθ(S0, D0), I can form the conditional
choice probabilities as a smooth function of θu:
P˜ r(Dt|Xt, θu) =
1∑
Dt
exp(∆ν˜(S0, D0))
And estimate the second stage likelihood estimator of θu:
˜ˆ
θu = argmax
θu
L(θu) =
A∑
a=1
Ta∑
t=1
Log[P˜ r(Dat+1|S
a
t+1, θu, θˆf )]
Since the simulated paths are sensitive to the simulated preference shocks ǫ˜t, I need
to repeat the process above for each observation a to acquire a consistent estimator of
θu. In this study, I expand each observation to 10 observations. Thus the maximum
likelihood estimator averages over the ǫ˜t and corrects for the possible bias.
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The estimation method provided here is based on the 2-stage maximum likelihood and
allows for incorporating fixed and unobserved heterogeneity types. Next section provides
the adjustment in the likelihood function that is needed for this purpose.
Incorporating the Unobserved Heterogeneity
Following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) I use the modified Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithm to address the fixed, unobserved heterogeneity. EM iterates over two steps. In the
Expectation step, the probabilities of choosing each alternative conditional on the observed
and unobserved states are updated. The maximization step can be done assuming the
unobserved states are observed and use the probabilities of each alternative conditional on
being in particular unobserved state as weights. The Likelihood function for observation n
at time t, when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced into the model can be written as:
Lt,n(Dnt, Sn,t|Snt, δ; θ) = Pr(Dnt|Snt, δ; θu).ftn(Sn,t|Dn,t−1, Sn, t− 1, δ; θf )
Where θ = {θu, θf} and, θf and θu are respectively first and second stage parameters, S
is observed heterogeneity and δ is unobserved heterogeneity in state space. Integrating out
unobserved heterogeneity the likelihood function and estimation problem are:
[θ̂, ζ̂] = argmax
θ,ζ
N∑
n=1
log(
S∑
s=1
ζ(δ|Sn1)
T∏
t=1
Lt(Dnt, Sn,t+1|.Snt, δ; θ))
Where ζ is the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. Note that the likelihood function
here, cannot be estimated by the familiar 2-stage procedure, because it is not a separable
likelihood. Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) show that the likelihood can be replaced by a
separable likelihood function suggested by Dempster et al. (1977) that shares the same First
Order Conditions. Defining q as the conditional probability of person n being in unobserved
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state s given data and parameters (θ, π):
q(δ|Dn, Sn; θ, ζ) =
ζ(δ|Sn1)
∏
t (Lt(Dnt, Sn,t+1|Snt, δ; θ))∑3
δ=1 ζ(δ|Sn1)
∏T
t=1 Lt(Dnt, Sn,t+1|Snt, δ; θ)
And ζ, the Average over all individuals in one observed state and gives the estimation of
ζ̂(δ|S1):
ζ̂(δ|S1) =
∑
n q(δ|Dn, Sn; θ̂, ẑeta)I(S1n = S1)∑
n I(S1n = S1)
The new separable likelihood function is defined as:
θ̂ = argmax
θ
∑
n
∑
t
q(s |. dn, xn; θ̂, π̂)Log(Lt(dnt, xnt, s, θ))
Note that, this maximization problem is separable in contrast with what we had before.
Also, it uses q(δ|Dn, Sn; θ̂, ζ̂) as population weight. To reveal the unknown q we assume it
as given and utilize EM algorithm iterations to reveal it.
Following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) and using CI feature, let j be the choice indicator,
given (Starting arbitrarily) ζ1 and θ1f we can calculate m+ 1 value of q(δ|Dn, Sn; θf , ζ) :
1. Expectation Step
qm+1(δ|Dn, Sn; θ
m
f , ζ
m) =
ζm(δ|Sn1)
∏
t (Lt(Dnt, Sn,t+1|Snt, δ, p
m; θmf ))∑3
δ′=1 ζ
m(δ′|Sn1)
∏T
t=1 Lt(Dnt, Sn,t+1|Snt, δ
′; θmf )
But, replacing the conditional choice probability by non-parametric, flexible estima-
tions, we do not need conditioning over θmu :
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Lt(Dnt, Sn,t+1|Snt, δ, p
m; θm)
=pt(Dnt|Snt, δ; θ
m
u )ft(Snt+1|Dnt, Snt, δ; θ
m
f )
=pmt (Dnt|Snt, δ)ft(Snt+1|Dnt, Snt, δ; θ
m
f )
=
∑N
n=1 (q
m(δ|Dn, Sn)DnjtI(Snt = St) )∑N
n=1 q
m(δ|Dn, Sn)I(Snt = St)
.ft(Snt+1|Dnt, Snt, δ; θ
m
f )
Then we have:
q(δ|Dn, Sn; θ
m
f , ζ
m) ∀ n→ ζ̂m+1(δ|S1) =
∑
n q
m+1 (δ|Dn, Sn; ζ̂M)I(S1n = S1)∑
n I(S1n = S1)
pm+1t (j|St, s) =
∑N
n=1 (q
m+1(δ|Dn, Sn)DnjtI(Snt = St) )∑N
n=1 q
m+1(δ|Dn, Sn)I(Snt = St)
2. Maximization Step: Now we can assume qm+1 as given and hence will be able to use a
separable maximization problem. Maximize with respect to θf using:
θm+1f = argmax
θf
∑
n
∑
t
∑
δ
qm+1(δ|Dn, Sn)log(ft(Snt+1|Dnt , Snt, δ; θf )
We should repeat these steps until reaching the relative convergence. Following Arcidiacono
and Miller (2011) and using CI feature, we have:
θm+1 = argmax
θ
∑
n
∑
t
∑
δ
{qm+1(δ|Dn, Sn) (log(pt(Dnt|Snt, δ; θu))
+ log(ft(Snt+1 |Dnt, Snt, δ; θf )) )}
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Appendix C
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
Tab. C.1: Social Security Benefit Amount if claimed at 62
Social Security Benefit Amount in 1000 Dollars
.1 3 6 9
Married 1.231∗ 1.044 1.445∗∗∗ 1.572∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17)
Lag SSB 0.870∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗ 1.823∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Income 0.923∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 5.657∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(1.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00)
Tenure 0.969 1.038∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Experience 0.956∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 65,775
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
Tab. C.2: Social Security Benefit Amount if claimed at Full Retirement Age
Social Security Benefit Amount in 1000 Dollars
.1 3 6 9
Married 0.738 0.422∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Lag SSB 0.553∗∗∗ 0.980 1.262∗∗∗ 1.363∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Income 0.895∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗ 0.998 1.053∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Gender 40.246∗∗∗ 1.813∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(9.32) (0.37) (0.09) (0.01)
Tenure 1.015 1.016 1.042∗ 1.068∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Experience 0.787∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 65,748
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
Tab. C.3: Social Security Benefit Amount if claimed at 70
Social Security Benefit Amount in 1000 Dollars
.1 3 6 9
Married 0.671∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.703∗
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
Lag SSB 0.526∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Income 0.895∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 38.882∗∗∗ 3.823∗∗∗ 0.734 0.171∗∗∗
(11.41) (0.91) (0.17) (0.04)
Tenure 1.034 0.955∗ 1.023 1.047∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Experience 0.782∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 64,298
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.4: Health Insurance Premiums and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private Insurance Employer Insurance Medicare Insurance Income
Married 0.712∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ -0.293∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12)
Gender -0.623∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ 0.026 -3.147∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13)
Age -0.315∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ 0.008 -1.438∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
Age2 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.123∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -1.029∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Education2 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Health Conditions -0.497∗∗∗ -0.021 0.410∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Health Conditions2 0.085∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CES-D -0.039∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10)
CESD2 -0.007∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.003 0.079∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Doctor Visit 0.335∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Doctor Visits2 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.019∗ -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Hospital 0.365∗∗∗ -0.081∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.124
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.21)
Hospital2 -0.018 0.035∗ -0.041∗∗ 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08)
Smoke -0.033 0.006 -0.071∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Full Retirement Age -0.481∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tenure 0.567∗∗∗
(0.05)
Tenure2 -0.001
(0.00)
Experience2 0.000
(0.00)
Phisical Health -1.636∗∗∗
(0.17)
Physical Health 2 0.213∗∗∗
(0.03)
N 73,689 74,629 74,066 82,225
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.5: Probability of Receiving Social Security Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
SS Receipient IV Shock Married
Married 0.209∗∗∗
(0.02)
CES-D -0.044∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.001 -0.077∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Phisical Health -0.182∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.01) (0.02)
Leisure 1.341∗∗∗
(0.03)
Income -0.023∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Hospital -0.029∗ -0.045
(0.01) (0.03)
Doctor Visit 0.010∗ 0.017∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Health Conditions 0.199∗∗∗
(0.01)
L.Assets 0.000∗∗∗
(0.00)
Female -0.177∗∗∗
(0.02)
Education 0.016∗∗∗
(0.00)
L.Involuntary Layoff -0.254∗∗∗
(0.05)
Consumption -0.026
(0.02)
L.Married -0.364∗∗∗ 6.160∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Bad Economic Environment -0.125
(0.08)
L.Tenure -0.006
(0.00)
L.Age -0.081∗∗∗
(0.00)
L.Income 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00)
L.Health Conditions 0.017
(0.02)
Private Insurance 0.817∗∗∗
(0.07)
Employer Insurance -0.161∗
(0.06)
Medicare Insurance 0.234∗∗∗
(0.07)
Exercise 0.018
(0.04)
Smoke -0.494∗∗∗
(0.05)
N 65,859 65,865 65,865
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.6: Total Medical Expenditure
Total Medical Expenditure
5 10 20 30 40 50
Married 1.118∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗ 1.166∗∗ 1.053
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Age 1.009∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 1.010∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Phisical Health 0.758∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.237∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Hospital 0.036∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 4.599∗∗∗ 5.040∗∗∗ 4.831∗∗∗ 6.837∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21)
Doctor Visit 1.060∗∗∗ 1.529∗∗∗ 1.018 1.268∗∗∗ 1.308∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Health Conditions 1.434∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.730∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗ 1.480∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Female 0.902∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 1.053 0.770∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Income 1.003∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.000 1.001 1.001 0.997∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 1.031∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 0.988∗ 1.033∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Private Insurance 0.969 0.892∗∗ 0.898 1.075 0.910 1.122
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Employer Insurance 1.035 0.941 0.923 1.064 0.902 0.909
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07)
Medicare Insurance 0.850∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.819∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
N 65,862
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.7: Mental Health
CES-D
1 2 6
L.Married 0.994 0.957 1.065
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
L.CES-D 1.849∗∗∗ 2.552∗∗∗ 3.480∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
L.Age 0.989∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Phisical Health 1.158∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 1.737∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
L.Leisure 1.015 1.028 1.142
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
L.Income 0.997∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Hospital 0.968 1.014 1.053
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
L.Doctor Visit 1.000 1.022∗∗∗ 1.020
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.Health Conditions 1.052∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Assets 1.000 1.000∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.944∗ 0.962 0.993
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Education 0.997 0.980∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Involuntary Layoff 1.148∗ 1.131 1.446∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.17)
L.Consumption 0.871∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.888∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
L.Smoke 1.056 1.239∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
L.Exercise 1.042 1.019 0.852∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
N 65,859
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.8: Physical Health
Physical Health (1: Excellent , 6: Death)
Very Good Good Fair Poor 6
L.Married 1.091∗∗∗ 1.014 0.870∗∗ 1.008 0.712∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04)
L.Phisical Health 3.232∗∗∗ 9.301∗∗∗ 29.641∗∗∗ 56.134∗∗∗ 9.008∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.20) (1.00) (4.83) (0.29)
Age 1.010∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Leisure 1.098∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗ 3.405∗∗ 2.301∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.20) (1.45) (0.29)
CES-D 1.212∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 1.670∗∗∗ 1.533∗∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Income 0.998∗∗ 0.998∗ 0.996 0.988 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Hospital 1.279∗∗∗ 1.591∗∗∗ 1.984∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗ 2.382∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08)
Doctor Visit 1.045∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Health Conditions 1.250∗∗∗ 1.463∗∗∗ 1.588∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04)
L.Assets 1.000∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 1.145∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗ 1.248 0.715∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.18) (0.03)
Education 0.982∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Exercise 0.735∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Smoke 1.068 1.175∗∗∗ 1.165∗ 1.278 2.130∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.26) (0.15)
N 65,859
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.9: Number of Health Conditions
Number of Health Conditions
1 3
Married 0.972 0.931
(0.05) (0.06)
L.Health Conditions 1.211e+10∗∗∗ 2.846e+11
(4.51e+08) (.)
Private Insurance 1.076 1.015
(0.08) (0.10)
Employer Insurance 0.968 0.862
(0.07) (0.08)
Medicare Insurance 1.334∗∗ 1.305∗
(0.12) (0.14)
L.Phisical Health 1.175∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
CES-D 1.094∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Age 1.002 1.004
(0.00) (0.01)
Income 1.000 0.997
(0.00) (0.00)
Hospital 2.110∗∗∗ 4.274∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.27)
Doctor Visit 1.237∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Exercise 0.867∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Smoke 1.110 1.171
(0.07) (0.10)
N 65,865
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
106
Tab. C.10: Number of Nights in Hospital
Number of Nights in Hospital
1 3
L.Married 0.988 0.886∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Private Insurance 1.157∗∗∗ 1.029
(0.05) (0.12)
Employer Insurance 1.155∗∗ 0.993
(0.05) (0.15)
Medicare Insurance 1.165∗∗∗ 1.228∗
(0.05) (0.12)
L.Phisical Health 1.228∗∗∗ 1.497∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
L.Health Conditions 1.129∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.04)
CES-D 1.048∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Age 1.022∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Leisure 1.307∗∗∗ 2.433∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.36)
Income 1.001 1.004
(0.00) (0.00)
Exercise 0.879∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Smoke 0.957 0.838∗
(0.03) (0.07)
Education 1.001 0.996
(0.00) (0.01)
L.Hospital 1.974∗∗∗ 3.221∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.08)
L.Doctor Visit 1.053∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
N 65,865
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Tab. C.11: Number of Doctor Visits
Number of Doctor Visits
1 5
L.Married 1.422∗∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Private Insurance 2.184∗∗∗ 2.795∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.19)
Employer Insurance 2.275∗∗∗ 2.827∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.19)
Medicare Insurance 1.845∗∗∗ 2.401∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.15)
L.Phisical Health 0.914∗∗∗ 1.019
(0.02) (0.02)
L.Health Conditions 1.195∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
CES-D 0.962∗∗ 0.983
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 1.002 0.999
(0.00) (0.00)
Leisure 1.423∗∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.11)
Income 1.011∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Exercise 1.054 0.985
(0.04) (0.04)
Smoke 0.734∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Education 1.054∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Hospital 1.775∗∗∗ 2.852∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.15)
L.Doctor Visit 1.317∗∗∗ 1.840∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
N 65,865
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Appendix D
ANALYSIS OF THE MOMENTS
To evaluate how well the model simulation matches the data I compare the first moments
of the outcomes conditional on age between the simulated results based on the current
policy (Medicare Eligibility age at 65) and data from HRS. The results of this comparison is
shown in the Table D.1 and Figures D.3 through D.5. Overall results show that the model is
replicating the truth (data) closely and is reliable to be used for the out of sample prediction.
In what follows, I discuss all the variables in five different groups: Labor supply, Monetary
variables, Health, Health investment, and health insurance.
Labor Supply Moments
Labor supply outcome, measured by annual hours of work, closely replicates the data mo-
ment. When an individual works a full-time job, he supplies 1260 hours annually. While
both simulated results and data show a high volume of job exits between age 60 and 70,
simulation indicates a faster reduction in labor supply than the data before age 65 and slower
reduction after age 65. The difference is rooted in both intensive as well as extensive mar-
gins. In another word, faster quits from full-time work and accepting a part-time job and
higher retirement rate before age 65 in the simulated data in comparison to the real data.
This trend is reversed for age 65 to 70. The trends are shown in Figure D.1.
Monetary Variables Moments
Consumption, Assets (Wealth), Annual Medical Expenditure and social security benefits are
considered as monetary variables. Simulated consumption is shown in the top-left graph
in Figure D.2 as well as column 5 of Table D.1 and replicates the data closely and shows
a slow increase in consumption as people are getting older. However, there is an anomaly
in consumption at age 50 that shows high consumption that is not in accordance with the
lifetime trends we can observe after age 50. Note that the data variation is high for before
age 60 that reflects the smaller sample size for this age group.
Wealth shows a steep positive slope as people are getting older and increases from 50,000 $ at
age 50 to about 180,000 at age 84 in the real data. Simulated data replicates this increase.
This is shown in the top-right graph in Figure D.2. Next monetary variable is Annual
Medical expenditure, shown in bottom-left graph of Figure D.2 and column 9 of Table D.1.
Both the real data and simulated results show a jump in medical expenditure at age 52 and
54 and slow increase after age 54. However, real data shows faster growth than simulated
data between 60 to 68. Social security benefit is traced using two variables: Probability
of receiving social security benefit and the amount of the social security benefit. While
probability of receiving social security rises rapidly from 44 % at age 62 (Early retirement
Age) to more than 90 % at age 70 in both real and simulated data, the growth is slower in
simulated data and reaches higher value of 96 % in comparison to 93 % in the real data.
The amount of annual social security benefit is higher in simulated data in almost all of the
age groups and is more persistent. Results are shown in columns 16 and 17 of Table D.1 and
bottom-right graph in Figure D.2.
Health Moments
Physical and mental health status, as well as the number of health conditions and the
probability of dying, are analyzed under the same title of health variables. Real and simulated
data moments for the physical health status are shown in the top-left graph of the Figure D.3
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and column 10 of table D.1. The overall trend of the reduction in health capital is grasped by
the simulation closely (Higher values of physical health status show worse health). However,
health status in simulated data diverges from the real data moment after age 80 and shows
slightly better health status.
Mental health as shown by the probability of depression in the bottom-right graph of the
Figure D.3 and as the CES-D measure in column 12 of the table D.1, shows improvements
in the mental health until age 70 and deterioration after that. Like the physical health,
mental health is replicated closely by the simulated data and the only divergence is after
age 80 where simulated data predict better mental health than the real data. While the
anomaly of the bad mental health can be seen beginning at age 50 due to the small sample
size, mental health is persistently low until age 65 and deterioration begins after age 68. All
of the changes in trends are captured closely by the simulation.
Number of health conditions is can vary between 0 and 8, is represented in top-right graph in
figure D.3 and in column 11 of the table D.1. Simulated and real data show no statistically
significant difference in 95 % confidence. In particular, simulation replicates the hump in
the data between age 54 and 58 and follows the normal pattern of increase in the number of
health conditions after age 60.
The last variable in the group of the health-related variables is the probability of dying that
is shown in the bottom-left graph of the figure D.3 and column 13 of the table D.1. While the
increasing probability trend is replicated closely by simulated data, simulation overpredicts
the data for age groups of 50-54 and 80-84.
Health Investment Moments
Health investment refers to four variables: Probability of exercise (vigorous activity), the
probability of smoke, the number of nights spent in the hospital and the number of doctor
visits. The first two variables are modeled as decisions and appear in the utility function,
while the number of nights in the hospital and the number of doctor visits are modeled
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as belief. The simulated and real data moments for the first health investment variable
(probability of exercise) are provided in column 15 of the table D.1 and the top-left graph
of the figure D.4. Data shows that this probability is close to one for the 50 years old people
in the sample, and noting the definition of the variable which is having vigorous activity is
reasonable since comparingly younger people are pursuing more active lifestyle than elderly
people. The probability drops rapidly to about .5 between age 50 to 56, and then the
reduction in the probability of exercise continues at a slower pace until it reaches .2 at age
84. The model does a good job in capturing the tends. However, the model underpredicts
the probability of vigorous activity before age 54 and after age 78. For the probability of
smoke, the model does a better job comparing to the probability of the vigorous activity and
replicates the data moments closely. Especially, it captures the rapid reduction in probability
between age 50 and 58. The results for this comparison is shown in column 14 of the table
D.1 and top-right graph in figure D.4.
The number of nights in the hospital is the next variable. bottom-left graph of the figure
D.4 and column 8 of the table D.1 show the data and simulated moments for this variable.
The difference between the two moments is not statistically significant at 95 % confidence
for any of the age groups, and the increase in utilization is captured by the simulation. The
number of nights in the hospital is increasing from .22 for age 50 to .57 at age 84. The next
measure of medical services utilization is the number of doctor visits that is shown in column
7 of the table D.1 and the bottom-right graph in the figure D.4. Like the number of nights
in the hospital, the number of doctor visits is closely replicated by the simulated data. After
a slight reduction in the number of doctor visits between age 50 to 54, it increases from 2.1
at age 54 about 3.5 at age 84.
Health Insurance Moments
This group of variables includes the probability of buying private health insurance and
employer health insurance. Private health insurance refers to the health insurance that is
112
bought directly by the individual and does not include the Medigap health insurance. The
real and simulated moments of the probability of buying private health insurance is shown
in the left graph in figure D.5 as well as column 6 of the table D.1. While the overall
trends of the data are grasped by the simulation, it is underpredicted for age 58 to 64 and
overpredicted for age 64 to 70. Employer health insurance is the next health insurance
decision in the model and is shown by the right graph in figure D.5. The model overpredicts
the employer health insurance for age 58 to 64 and underpredicts it for age 64 to 68. It
confirms that there is a complementary relationship between Private health insurance and
employer health insurance and individuals are substituting one for another in the model.
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Fig. D.1: First moment comparison of the real data and simulated data under the current policy
for the different measures of Labor Supply.
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Fig. D.2: First moment comparison of the real data and simulated data under the current policy
for the Monetary Variables.
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Fig. D.3: First moment comparison of the real data and simulated data under the current policy
for the different measures of Health.
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Fig. D.4: First moment comparison of the real data and simulated data under the current policy
for the different types of the Health Investments.
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Fig. D.5: First moment comparison of the real data and simulated data under the current policy
for the purchasing probability of different types of Health Insurance.
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Tab. D.1: Data and simulated moments
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 Total
Hours of Work Data 1,055.250 1,018.577 704.477 373.215 211.625 113.174 53.904 402.659
Simulate 1,068.712 1,010.089 716.864 399.711 185.142 165.123 40.615 335.526
-(00.315) (00.228) -(00.413) -(01.241) (02.106) -(04.629) (01.740) (06.971)
Leisure Data 0.165 0.194 0.439 0.708 0.838 0.913 0.959 0.694
Simulate 0.154 0.201 0.433 0.684 0.858 0.874 0.971 0.737
(00.312) -(00.226) (00.270) (01.407) -(02.019) (04.486) -(01.983) -(05.662)
Years of Tenure Data 9.448 9.396 6.996 3.382 1.705 0.829 0.421 3.576
Simulate 9.339 9.473 6.749 4.045 1.458 1.317 0.379 3.072
(00.152) -(00.121) (00.645) -(02.568) (01.759) -(04.047) (00.506) (04.499)
Assets Data 102.709 94.784 122.201 154.738 160.417 169.275 173.639 147.624
Simulate 112.026 88.521 124.072 149.128 156.912 175.342 176.490 151.948
-(00.672) (00.583) -(00.231) (00.629) (00.493) -(00.631) -(00.331) -(01.316)
Consumption Data 47.155 45.708 45.145 45.306 46.029 46.365 46.647 45.943
Simulate 48.784 44.614 45.610 44.807 45.843 46.694 45.636 45.966
-(00.996) (00.772) -(00.488) (00.533) (00.252) -(00.332) (01.202) -(00.067)
Private Data 0.138 0.151 0.131 0.015 0.033 0.023 0.015 0.058
Health Insurance Simulate 0.150 0.142 0.113 0.047 0.029 0.030 0.011 0.051
-(00.364) (00.311) (01.006) -(02.827) (00.673) -(01.103) (00.920) (01.676)
Doctor Visits Data 2.034 2.180 2.732 3.150 3.324 3.446 3.666 3.102
Simulate 1.826 2.321 2.709 3.126 3.331 3.429 3.631 3.176
(01.090) -(00.841) (00.199) (00.211) -(00.081) (00.158) (00.357) -(01.786)
Hospital Data 0.118 0.219 0.239 0.344 0.400 0.403 0.535 0.373
Simulate 0.182 0.173 0.250 0.321 0.401 0.402 0.546 0.392
-(01.995) (01.224) -(00.404) (00.658) -(00.010) (00.017) -(00.314) -(01.506)
Total Medical Data 5.911 8.903 10.820 12.332 12.560 12.058 15.124 12.170
Expenditure Simulate 7.019 8.070 11.186 11.783 11.947 13.200 15.038 12.555
-(01.062) (00.932) -(00.538) (00.700) (01.020) -(01.439) (00.110) -(01.351)
Health Data 1.828 1.874 1.882 1.973 2.204 2.310 2.740 2.276
Simulate 1.855 1.854 1.849 1.996 2.202 2.310 2.974 2.328
-(00.318) (00.289) (00.718) -(00.483) (00.049) (00.007) -(04.358) -(02.387)
Health Data 1.315 1.608 1.888 2.120 2.393 2.496 2.592 2.199
Conditions Simulate 1.351 1.577 1.865 2.118 2.365 2.543 2.617 2.258
-(00.321) (00.317) (00.354) (00.035) (00.653) -(00.920) -(00.581) -(02.647)
CES-D Data 1.059 1.223 0.900 0.850 0.860 0.867 1.002 0.948
Simulate 1.159 1.151 0.874 0.882 0.917 0.763 0.984 0.934
-(00.734) (00.618) (00.388) -(00.493) -(01.045) (01.600) (00.321) (00.584)
Probability of Data 0.015 0.014 0.004 0.015 0.039 0.032 0.074 0.050
Dying Simulate 0.018 0.012 0.004 0.013 0.017 0.070 0.094 0.062
-(00.317) (00.308) -(00.077) (00.233) (02.612) -(02.879) -(01.460) -(02.643)
Smoke Data 0.360 0.263 0.203 0.195 0.162 0.113 0.059 0.162
Simulate 0.311 0.298 0.198 0.200 0.160 0.120 0.074 0.149
(01.066) -(00.995) (00.193) -(00.241) (00.166) -(00.355) -(00.971) (01.731)
Exercise Data 0.438 0.424 0.403 0.394 0.372 0.354 0.223 0.344
Simulate 0.421 0.437 0.390 0.409 0.393 0.316 0.203 0.334
(00.371) -(00.317) (00.507) -(00.559) -(01.037) (01.430) (00.883) (00.993)
Probability of Data 0.342 0.933 0.946 0.916 0.616 0.584
Receiving SSB Simulate 0.424 0.931 0.981 0.981 0.887 0.765
-(03.179) (00.090) -(04.534) -(05.316) -(13.372) -(19.966)
SSB Data 4.442 5.918 5.402 4.488 2.532 3.857
Simulate 4.234 6.425 6.375 6.239 5.833 5.325
(01.221) -(04.579) -(11.852) -(15.806) -(27.365) -(24.827)
Probability of Data 0.547 0.547 0.515 0.456 0.476 0.481 0.399 0.463
Being Married Simulate 0.558 0.539 0.518 0.460 0.494 0.447 0.416 0.452
-(0.237) (0.196) -(0.099) -(0.146) -(0.883) (1.226) -(0.752) (1.201)
t-statistics in parentheses
Expected outcome is calculated for the weighted average of people at age 50. The probability of living each period affects the
expected value of the outcome of interests.
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Appendix E
MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR THE DIFFERENT SUB-SAMPLES
Fig. E.1: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
different Health Investments
���
�
���
��
�
���
�
���
���
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
�����������������������
���
�
�
���
���
���
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
��������������������
���
�
���
�
���
�
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
������������������
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
�
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
�����������������������
����������� ��������������� ����������������
The effect of a change in policy (E[x|MEA = 69]− E[x|MEA = 65]) on health insurance for two different samples: Weighted
average sample and sample of poor people in poor health. The confidence interval is calculated at the 95 % confidence level,
where the source of variation is the estimated covariance matrix of the utility parameters. Simulation pool (sample) consists of
the people who are 50 years old. The pool is weighted for different characteristics to match the characteristics, observed in the
real data for 50 years old people. To produce the simulation pool for the poor people in poor health, assets, health status and
the number of health conditions reset to the 10th, 90th and 90th percentiles at age 50, respectively. This leads to 50,000 $ of
assets, fair health (hp = 3) and three health conditions at age 50.
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Fig. E.2: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on the
different measures of Health
���
�
���
���
�
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
�������������
���
�
���
��
���
�
���
��
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
���������������������������
���
�
���
��
���
�
���
��
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
��������������������
���
��
���
��
�
���
�
���
�
���
�
����
����
��
��
���
���
��
��
��
��
�� �� �� �� ��
���
�������������������������
����������� ��������������� ����������������
The effect of a change in policy (E[x|MEA = 69] − E[x|MEA = 65]) on health for two different samples: Weighted average
sample and sample of poor people in poor health. The confidence interval is calculated at the 95 % confidence level, where
the source of variation is the estimated covariance matrix of the utility parameters. Simulation pool (sample) consists of the
people who are 50 years old. The pool is weighted for different characteristics to match the characteristics, observed in the real
data for 50 years old people. To produce the simulation pool for the poor people in poor health, assets, health status and the
number of health conditions reset to the 10th, 90th and 90th percentiles at age 50, respectively. This leads to 50,000 $ of assets,
fair health (hp = 3) and three health conditions at age 50.
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Fig. E.3: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on Labor
Supply
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The effect of a change in policy (E[x|MEA = 69] − E[x|MEA = 65]) on labor supply for two different samples: Weighted
average sample and sample of poor people in poor health. The confidence interval is calculated at the 95 % confidence level,
where the source of variation is the estimated covariance matrix of the utility parameters. Simulation pool (sample) consists of
the people who are 50 years old. The pool is weighted for different characteristics to match the characteristics, observed in the
real data for 50 years old people. To produce the simulation pool for the poor people in poor health, assets, health status and
the number of health conditions reset to the 10th, 90th and 90th percentiles at age 50, respectively. This leads to 50,000 $ of
assets, fair health (hp = 3) and three health conditions at age 50.
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Fig. E.4: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on the
Monetary Variables
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The effect of a change in policy (E[x|MEA = 69] − E[x|MEA = 65]) on the different monetary variables for two different
samples: Weighted average sample and sample of poor people in poor health. The confidence interval is calculated at the
95 % confidence level, where the source of variation is the estimated covariance matrix of the utility parameters. Simulation
pool (sample) consists of the people who are 50 years old. The pool is weighted for different characteristics to match the
characteristics, observed in the real data for 50 years old people. To produce the simulation pool for the poor people in
poor health, assets, health status and the number of health conditions reset to the 10th, 90th and 90th percentiles at age 50,
respectively. This leads to 50,000 $ of assets, fair health (hp = 3) and three health conditions at age 50.
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Fig. E.5: The average marginal effects of change in Medicare Eligibility Age from 65 to 69 on
different types of the Health Insurance
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The effect of a change in policy (E[x|MEA = 69]−E[x|MEA = 65]) on the different types of health insurance for two different
samples: Weighted average sample and sample of poor people in poor health. The confidence interval is calculated at the
95 % confidence level, where the source of variation is the estimated covariance matrix of the utility parameters. Simulation
pool (sample) consists of the people who are 50 years old. The pool is weighted for different characteristics to match the
characteristics, observed in the real data for 50 years old people. To produce the simulation pool for the poor people in
poor health, assets, health status and the number of health conditions reset to the 10th, 90th and 90th percentiles at age 50,
respectively. This leads to 50,000 $ of assets, fair health (hp = 3) and three health conditions at age 50.
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Appendix F
MEDICARE AT 61: SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Tab. F.1: Average effects of change in the policy
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84
Hours of Work MEA : 65 1,369.307 1,237.003 653.902 325.312 306.780 315.946 291.935
MEA : 61 1,333.178 823.668 444.614 400.000 395.231 366.015 344.284
-(02.73) -(18.00) -(10.79) (02.73) (04.04) (01.67) (02.09)
Assets MEA : 65 65.745 65.745 70.589 70.589 106.309 106.309 118.449
MEA : 61 66.238 66.238 65.054 65.054 101.269 101.269 112.295
(00.14) -(00.58) -(01.63) -(00.87) -(01.01) -(00.84) -(00.77)
Consumption MEA : 65 45.746 45.011 45.591 45.148 44.697 45.167 42.479
MEA : 61 45.795 46.039 46.507 45.576 44.766 45.219 42.358
(00.13) (01.66) (02.20) (00.66) (00.15) (00.07) -(00.19)
Doctor Visits MEA : 65 2.468 2.815 2.961 3.411 3.562 3.674 3.414
MEA : 61 2.439 2.810 3.175 3.516 3.623 3.677 3.411
-(00.55) -(00.06) (04.08) (01.46) (01.12) (00.04) -(00.05)
Hospital MEA : 65 0.148 0.121 0.167 0.258 0.295 0.407 0.392
MEA : 61 0.146 0.130 0.202 0.265 0.291 0.392 0.388
-(00.17) (00.71) (03.12) (00.37) -(00.24) -(00.54) -(00.20)
Total Medical MEA : 65 6.159 7.350 9.141 10.839 11.217 14.243 12.575
Expenditure MEA : 61 6.167 7.442 9.208 11.145 11.325 14.070 12.471
(00.04) (00.30) (00.24) (00.64) (00.34) -(00.29) -(00.23)
Health MEA : 65 1.745 1.797 2.012 2.337 2.808 3.394 4.023
MEA : 61 1.749 1.815 2.083 2.410 2.852 3.437 4.082
(00.16) (00.46) (02.01) (01.28) (00.84) (00.58) (00.96)
CES-D MEA : 65 0.958 0.726 0.689 0.686 0.577 0.588 0.518
MEA : 61 0.947 0.731 0.717 0.724 0.610 0.616 0.557
-(00.31) (00.13) (01.05) (00.84) (01.16) (00.66) (01.13)
Life Expectancy MEA : 65 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93
MEA : 61 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93
-(00.93) -(00.38) -(00.21) -(00.02) -(00.17) -(00.08) -(00.45)
Probability of MEA : 65 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.870 0.948 0.968 0.929
Receiving SSB MEA : 61 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.875 0.946 0.975 0.929
(04.98) (00.36) -(00.31) (00.93) -(00.01)
SSB MEA : 65 0.000 0.000 3.915 6.490 6.480 6.525 6.212
MEA : 61 0.000 0.000 3.825 6.300 6.273 6.286 6.058
-(02.61) -(02.38) -(02.88) -(02.55) -(01.61)
Probability of MEA : 65 0.598 0.602 0.576 0.542 0.462 0.397 0.307
Being Married MEA : 61 0.599 0.609 0.596 0.565 0.471 0.387 0.277
(00.07) (00.33) (01.20) (01.08) (00.54) -(00.41) -(01.52)
t-statistics in parentheses
For each outcome, the first two rows are the outcome under the current (MEA: 65) or counterfactual policy (MEA: 61). Values
in parentheses are t-statistics of the null hypothesis, H0 : E(XMEA :65|Age) = E(XMEA :61|Age). The effects under the current
and the counterfactual policies are simulated by employing the pool of individuals at age 50 and weight for other characteristics
to reflect the population of 50 years old in the sample. The pool size is 3000 and the simulation is continued for 40 years.
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Tab. F.2: Expected value of the outcome at age 50
Variable MEA : 65 MEA : 61 Difference
Total Hours of Work 22,420.17 20,357.22 -2,062.96
(208.42) (158.74) -(11.37)
Assets 97,807.99 92,864.77 -4,943.22
(116.44) (116.76) -(5.51)
Total Consumption 1,506,692.17 1,500,493.91 -6,198.26
(363.46) (362.29) -(1.06)
Total Doctor Visits 106.02 106.30 0.27
(296.34) (295.18) (.54)
Total Hospital 8.47 8.55 0.07
(150.52) (145.73) (.88)
Total Medical Expenditure 342,173.91 338,747.83 -3,426.09
(223.78) (216.94) -(1.55)
Health 5.45 5.58 0.13
(508.35) (509.91) (4.06)
CES-D 0.68 0.71 0.02
(195.39) (191.58) (2.9)
Life Expectancy 33.01 32.59 -0.42
(385.09) (375.12) -(3.4)
Number of Years Receiving SSB 18.84 18.81 -0.03
(224.55) (223.29) -(.26)
Total SSB 137,342.61 131,269.57 -6,073.04
(216.62) (206.68) -(6.76)
Number of years being married 16.17 16.17 0.00
(151.08) (155.52) -(.59)
t-statistics in parentheses
Values in parantheses are t-statistics of the null hypothesis, H0 : E(XData|Age) = E(XSimulatied|Age)
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